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ABSTRACT 
 
3+1 ESSAYS ON THE TURKISH ECONOMY 
Yücel, Mustafa Eray 
Ph.D., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Berument 
 
 
September 2005 
 
 
This dissertation comprise of four essays. The first essay studies the relationship 
between treasury auction maturity and auction interest rates.  Using the Turkish 
auction data from 1988 to 2004, a reciprocal linkage between auction interest rates 
and maturities is observed, especially for the 1995-2000 period. This suggests that 
under an adverse shock, treasury decreases the auction maturity in order not to 
increase interest rates too much. A change in this reciprocal relationship is also 
reported for the post-2001 era. The second essay assesses the effect of USD-Euro 
parity on a small open economy for an economy where its exports are predominantly 
denominated in Euros and imports are denominated in USD. The empirical evidence 
suggests that a positive innovation in USD-Euro parity appreciates the local 
currency, decreases inflation and increases output. The third essay studies the 
 iv 
relationship between on-budget and off-budget expenditures in Turkey and concludes 
that information content of the budget deficit statistics is not empty; however, it 
might be misleading in assessing fiscal stance for Turkey. The final essay 
investigates the connection between Turkish industrial production performance and 
the success of a popular Turkish football team, namely Fenerbahce. The success of 
Fenerbahce is interpreted as a proxy for the workers' mood or morale. Performing a 
transfer function analysis on my monthly data set, I reveal a positive feedback from 
Fenerbahce's success, which proxies workers' mood/morale, to economic 
performance. Evidence of the effects of games against domestic rivals on industrial 
performance is not statistically significant. 
 
Keywords: Confidence crisis, Debt management, Debt maturity and Yield curve, 
USD-Euro Parity, Output, Inflation, and Real Exchange Rate, Consolidated Budget, 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, Fiscal Stance, Vector Auto Regression. 
Mood, Morale and Productivity 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKYE EKONOMS ÜSTÜNE 3+1 MAKALE 
Yücel, Mustafa Eray 
Doktora, ktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Berument 
 
 
Eylül 2005 
 
 
Bu tez dört makaleden olumaktadır. lk makalede Hazine ihale vadeleri ile 
ihale faizleri arasındaki iliki incelenmitir. 1988’den 2004’e kadar Türkiye Hazine 
verileri kullanıldıında – özellikle 1995-2000 dönemi için –  ihale faizleri ve vadeleri 
arasında ters yönlü bir iliki gözlenmitir. Bu bulgu Hazine’nin ihale vadelerini, 
faizleri fazla artırmayacak biçimde seçtiine iaret etmektedir. 2001 sonrası dönem 
için ise söz konusu ters yönlü ilikinin deitii rapor edilmektedir. kinci makalede 
ABD doları-Avro paritesinin – ihracatı çounlukla Avro ve ithalatı çounlukla dolar 
cinsinden yapılan – bir küçük açık ekonomiye etkileri incelenmektedir. Ampirik 
bulgular, Dolar-Avro paritesindeki bir artıın ulusal para birimini deerlendirdiini, 
enflasyonu düürücü olduunu ve çıktıyı artırdıını göstermitir. Üçüncü makalede, 
bütçe dahilinde ve haricinde gelien kamu harcamaları arasındaki iliki 
 vi 
incelenmektedir. Çalımanın ana bulgusu bütçe açıı istatistiklerinin enformasyon 
açısından deersiz olmadııdır; ancak bu istatistikler Türkiye ekonomisi için maliye 
politikasının duruunu ölçmekte kullanıldıında yanıltıcı neticeler dourabilecektir. 
Son makalede, Türkiye’nin sanayi üretim performansı ile popüler bir futbol 
takımının – Fenerbahçe –baarısı arasındaki balantı ele alınmaktadır. 
Fenerbahçe’nin baarısı çalıanların ruh hallerinin veya morallerinin bir ölçüsü 
olarak yorumlanmaktadır. Gerçekletirilen transfer fonksiyonu analizine göre, 
toplumsal moralin ölçüsü olan takımın uluslararası kupalardaki baarısı ile ekonomik 
performans arasında aynı yönlü ve anlamlı bir iliki söz konusudur. Aynı iliki 
takımın yurt içi baarıları için gözlenememitir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Güven bunalımı, Borç yönetimi, Borç vadesi, Verim erisi, 
Dolar-Avro paritesi, Çıktı, Enflasyon, Reel döviz kuru, Konsolide bütçe, Kamu 
kesimi borçlanma gerei, Mali duru, Vektör Otoregresyon, Ruh hali, Maneviyat, 
Üretkenlik. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: ANATOMY OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation is a collection of four essays, each of which is meant to deal 
with a specific question offered by the contemporary macroeconomic and/or social 
problems in Turkey. This chapter provides a cursory look at the dissertation essays 
and summarizes the main characteristics of each essay in attempt at providing the 
reader with a bird’s eye view of the overall content. 
Chapter 2 (Essay 1) is motivated by the observation that effective public debt 
management is one of the most important tasks for economic policy makers. It is 
especially important in countries that have debt rollover concerns due to financial 
stress and macroeconomic instability. In that sense, the Turkish economy provides a 
unique laboratory for studying the return-maturity relationship that could emerge 
under financial stress.  Firstly, the Turkish debt was able to rollover throughout 
history but there was always a non-zero default risk. Secondly, the Turkish economy 
operated under chronic high and volatile inflation for more than three decades, which 
resembles the risk on real return. Merging these observations with the political 
instability of successive coalition governments, the “lack of confidence” in economic 
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policymakers can be easily comprehended. These observations underline the inherent 
financial stress and macroeconomic stability. 
The first essay (Chapter 2), using the Turkish treasury auction data of the July 
1988- December 2004 period, reveals a statistically significant negative relationship 
between treasury auction maturity and interest rates, indicating a negatively sloped 
yield curve, specifically for the pre-2001 sample. Based on this finding, I argue that 
the low credibility of policy-makers regarding inflation commitment that is 
associated with macroeconomic instability and the default risk shortens the 
maturities with higher interest rates due to the reluctance of creditors to extend funds 
for the long-term financing of public deficits. Changes in the slope of the estimated 
yield curve in the post-2001 sub-sample are also reported in Chapter 2. It is worth to 
note that the post-2001 period is characterized by lower deficits, lower default risk, 
successful stabilization to decrease inflation and higher political stability. 
In the second essay (Chapter 3), I turn my attention to a recently highlighted 
development, namely the evolution of USD-Euro parity and its effects on Turkey, 
which is a small open economy (SOE). USD-Euro parity is one of the most widely 
followed variables in financial markets. Its sizable movements have often been 
elaborated on as regards their implications on developed economies. In Chapter 3, I 
assess the implications of USD-Euro parity (the US dollar value of the Euro) on an 
SOE under unbalanced trade denomination, where the exports are realized mainly in 
one currency and imports in another. In the essay, based on an illustrative model of 
the transmission of external parity movements to SOE dynamics, the effects of USD-
Euro parity are analyzed using Turkish data. The relative movements of these major 
currencies are plausible to affect the major macroeconomic variables in Turkey. 
These effects may occur through the channels of the real exchange rate and/or the 
 3 
terms of trade.  In fact, neither overlaps the other in a one-to-one fashion nor are they 
isolated from each other.  In either of these channels, net exports will respond to 
USD-Euro parity as a result of the change in the relative prices of tradables. In my 
illustrative model, USD-Euro parity enters the system by affecting net exports and 
domestic absorption. 
The relevance of the relationship between USD-Euro parity and the real 
exchange rate is two-fold in the case of Turkey.  Firstly, Turkey as an SOE cannot 
affect USD-Euro parity, but the reverse is true.  Therefore, my investigation focuses 
only on the effects of exogenous USD-Euro parity shocks on domestic 
macroeconomic performance, rather than looking in the opposite direction.  
Secondly, the currency composition of Turkey’s trade is not balanced.  Moreover, 
Turkey is a net exporter of tourism services and receives revenue from tourism, 
mostly originating from Europe. This further enhances the effects of USD-Euro 
parity on the domestic economy.  Hence, a change in USD-Euro parity is expected to 
have sizable effects on Turkish economic performance. 
In order to account for the exogeneity of USD-Euro parity, I assess the 
relationship within the VAR framework with block exogeneity.  In particular, I allow 
USD-Euro parity to affect the Turkish economic performance, but not vice versa. 
The empirical evidence provided in Chapter 3 suggests that an increase in the USD 
value of the Euro appreciates the real exchange rate, decreases inflation and increases 
output. The analysis and findings of Chapter 3 are important: The case of Turkey 
with regard to changes in USD-Euro parity establishes a benchmark example for 
similar emerging market economies by demonstrating the extent of the exposure of a 
small-open economy to the relative movements of two big currencies.  
 4 
Chapter 4 (Essay 3) assesses the relationship between on-budget and off-
budget public expenditures. This relationship is especially interesting for economies 
like Turkey, in which the ratio of the consolidated budget to the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) changes from year to year and does not exhibit a 
stable pattern. The analysis of Chapter 4 reveals that the information content of the 
consolidated budget deficit statistics is not empty. My major result is that the PSBR 
increases in response to a positive innovation to the consolidated budget deficit.  In 
other words, even when the policy-makers induce an expansion of the consolidated 
budget, it is still possible for the off-budget items to increase. One another important 
point that needs to be highlighted is that a decrease in PSBR deficit is actually 
associated with an increase in budget deficit.  This might be due to increased efforts 
in the past to limit off-consolidated budget deficit, so that total (PSBR) deficit 
decreases, but I put partly these decreased items to the consolidated budget.  This 
suggests that even if a tight fiscal policy is adopted, the consolidated budget deficit 
might indicate loose fiscal policy.  Thus, it is worth to mention that the information 
provided by the consolidated budget deficit might be misleading for judging about 
the stance of the fiscal policy in Turkey.  
The significance of Chapter 4 is two-folds.  First, I provide evidence 
regarding the low reliability of the consolidated budget deficit statistics in evaluating 
the stance of fiscal policy in Turkey. Then, I extend the previous work by performing 
the analysis under asymmetric movements of the consolidated government budget, 
hence accounting for the functional relationship between on-budget and off-budget 
activities. 
The last essay (Chapter 5) examines the connection between Turkish 
industrial production performance and the success of a popular Turkish football 
 5 
team, namely Fenerbahce. The success of Fenerbahce is interpreted as a proxy for the 
workers' mood/morale.  Performing a transfer function analysis on my data set, I 
reveal a positive feedback from Fenerbahce's success to economic performance such 
that the monthly industrial growth rate increases with the number of games won by 
Fenerbahce in foreign cups, regardless of where the game is played. On the other 
hand, the evidence of the effects of Fenerbahce’s domestic games on industrial 
performance is not statistically significant.  Based on my findings, it can be argued 
that there is a psychological/social link between the success of a top rank Turkish 
team and the performance of workers in industry. 
The main claim of Chapter 5 is that when people’s favorite team is successful 
then they get in a better mood and become more productive.  Since we do not have a 
direct measure of “mood”, I employ the success of a popular football team as an 
indicator of people’s “mood”.  I also provide an array of possible theoretical 
explanations for my hypothesis and propose a transmission mechanism that defines 
the process that links football success to workers’ productivity.  More specifically, 
Fenerbahce’s success is expected to affect the industrial production growth positively 
and in a statistically significant manner.  The validity of this hypothesis is tested 
under different setups to check for the robustness of my statistical assessment. 
I should admit that my choice of Fenerbahce as the object of analysis does 
not represent any subjective preferences.  This choice is basically motivated by the 
general perception of the team by the Turkish society often uses the phrase 
“Fenerbahce Republic”.  That is, the team is a stylized example/symbol of a long-
lived sports institution and supporters’ strong loyalty to it. The proposed mechanism 
linking the social mood and productivity is as follows: The process is triggered by 
some temporary innovations to social cohesion among the supporters of a team.  
 6 
Football success, in this regard, is an innovation that boosts the morale and self-
esteem of the fans of a team.  This will elevate the individuals’ morale and self-
esteem.  In this way, there will be a positive affect, then this higher self-esteem will 
lead to higher production due to better social behavior and more efficient decision 
making. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 RETURN AND MATURITY RELATIONSHIPS FOR TREASURY 
AUCTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Effective public debt management is one of the most important tasks for 
economic policy makers.  This is especially important in countries that have debt 
rollover concerns due to financial stress and macroeconomic instability. This essay 
investigates the treasury auction maturity-yield relationship for Turkey and reveals a 
negative relationship between the auction maturity and interest rates ––a downward 
sloping yield curve. 
The perception of risk determines the way the risk is priced. Calvo and 
Guidotti (1990a,b) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) state that a government's 
opportunity to increase inflation is a channel through which perceivable risk emerges 
on creditors’ returns, i.e. governments can induce higher inflation in the medium-to-
long term in order to decrease the real value of its debt repayments, which causes a 
decrease in ex post real returns. Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) consider the 
possibility of default as another channel. 
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Regarding the effect of maturity on sustainability, it is emphasized in the 
literature that short-maturity debt must be refinanced often, which increases financial 
stress (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina et al., 1990; Missale and Blanchard, 
1994). Among these, Alesina et al. (1990) theoretically assess the management of 
debt when the government faces the possibility of a confidence crisis. They assert 
that optimal debt management requires issuing long maturity debt, which is evenly 
concentrated at all future dates, and even at relatively higher interest rates; rather 
than concentrating on short-term only.1 
 Calvo and Guidotti (1992) analyze the role of debt maturity in a framework 
of tax smoothing and time inconsistency of optimal policy2. Their model also 
suggests that a negative linkage between the maturity of a debt and the associated 
real return does exist. Drudi and Giordano (2000) study the default risk in a similar 
manner and show that long-term debt may not be operational when real rates are very 
high.3 
 This essay, using the Turkish treasury auction data of the July 1988- 
December 2004 period, reveals a statistically significant negative relationship 
between treasury auction maturity and interest rates, indicating a negatively sloped 
yield curve, specifically for the pre-2001 sample. Based on this finding, I argue that 
the low credibility of policy-makers regarding inflation commitment that is 
                                                
1
 In a later article, Alesina, Broek, Prati and Tabellini (1992) investigate the default risk for indebted 
OECD countries and assert that the likelihood of default is low as long as the existing debt is rolled-
over at reasonable interest rates. There is a positive association between the likelihood of a confidence 
crisis and the level of debt, where the default premium is positively associated with the size of the 
debt and negatively associated with average maturity. 
2
 In Calvo and Guidotti (1992) optimality is achieved with perfect tax smoothing at zero inflation in 
the case of the government's full pre-commitment to its inflation and default policies. However, in the 
absence of the government's pre-commitment to its inflation and debt repudiation policies, a negative 
linkage between the average maturity and the level of debt is achieved as a second-best solution. 
3
 Alesina et al. (1990) and Alesina et al. (1992) imply the conclusion of Calvo and Guidotti (1992) and 
Drudi and Giordano (2000) under different assumptions; the first two studies treat maturity as 
exogenous but the latter two treat it as endogenous. 
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associated with macroeconomic instability and the default risk shortens the 
maturities with higher interest rates due to the reluctance of creditors to extend funds 
for the long-term financing of public deficits. Changes in the slope of the estimated 
yield curve in the post-2001 sub-sample are also reported in the essay. It is worth 
noting that the post-2001 period is characterized by lower deficits, lower default risk, 
successful stabilization to decrease inflation and higher political stability. 
 The Turkish economy provides a unique laboratory for studying the return-
maturity relationship that could emerge under financial stress.  Firstly, the Turkish 
debt was able to rollover throughout history but there was always a non-zero default 
risk, as in Alesina et al. (1992).  Secondly, the Turkish economy operated under 
chronic high and volatile inflation for more than three decades, which resembles the 
risk on real return as put forth by Calvo and Guidotti (1990a,b) and Missale and 
Blanchard (1994). Merging these observations with the political instability of 
successive coalition governments, the “lack of confidence” in economic 
policymakers can be easily comprehended.4 These observations underline the 
inherent financial stress and macroeconomic stability.  
 Section 2 summarizes a framework upon which I develop my empirical 
analysis. Section 3 presents my modeling approach and the estimates. Section 4 
discusses the findings and concludes the essay. 
2.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The negative association between maturity and return can be deduced for a 
utility maximizing agent with tax distortions where the government can issue both 
short- and long-term bonds and with a non-zero default risk. One may consider a 
                                                
4
 Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001) gives a recent history of the Turkish economy. 
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version of Alesina et al (1990) model, in which a representative individual 
maximizes her lifetime utility and the government minimizes its loss function.5 
The individual derives non-negative utility from her consumption in each 
period through a regular concave utility function.  In every period, she is endowed 
with one unit of non-storable output and pays a distortionary tax to government, 
where the size of the distortion is convex in the tax rate. She has access to perfect 
international capital markets in which she can borrow and lend at a risk-free interest 
rate equal to her discount factor.  
 There exist short- and long-term debt instruments. Government can repudiate 
some fraction of its obligations in each period. This fraction is called the default 
parameter and assumed to be invariant between the short- and long-term debts. The 
government finances the non-repudiated part of its obligations by means of newly 
levied taxes and/or newly issued debt. Its loss function includes the financing cost of 
the existing debt and the cost of tax distortions. 
The government does not have any incentive to repudiate if the cost of 
repudiation is larger than the tax distortions needed for servicing the debt. However, 
this picture gets complicated when there is a non-zero repudiation risk. In order to 
illustrate this, suppose that the private expectations about the future fraction of 
repudiated debt do not depend on the history of the game, and that people expect full 
repudiation at some future date. Under such circumstances, the government will 
choose to repay only if the cost of repudiation exceeds the total discounted cost of 
future tax distortions. The discounted sum of tax distortions is larger in the case of a 
confidence crisis compared to a no-crisis scenario.  Hence, if the government’s cost 
of repudiation lies between these two figures, then there exists an equilibrium in 
                                                
5
 A detailed presentation of this model is available in the Appendix 1. One could also use a version of 
Calvo and Guidotti's (1992) model to show the negative relationship between maturity and (real) 
interest rate.  This version of the formal model is also given in the Appendix 1. 
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which a confidence crisis may occur in the current period or earlier. Eventually, the 
discounted sum of tax distortions, which is the government’s threshold to pay or not 
to pay its existing obligations, depends on the maturity structure of public debt. 
The basic lesson of the Alesina et al (1990) model is that equilibrium with a 
confidence crisis is less likely to occur if (1) only long-term debt is issued and (2) the 
same amount of debt matures in each period. One may further elaborate their model 
to show that the maturity of debt negatively affects the yield of bonds. That is, if the 
maturity shortens, the cost of tax distortions becomes higher, thus the fraction of the 
repudiated debt increases. This increase, using the no arbitrage condition, causes the 
bond price to decrease, which is equivalent to an increase in the real return on the 
bond.  In a nutshell, Alesina et al (1990) suggests that the maturity of the debt 
negatively affects the yield of bonds [A]. 
The default risk premium is also taken into consideration by Alesina et al 
(1990). If the expected fraction of repudiated debt is non-zero in every period with a 
known probability, the government has to pay a risk premium on its liability to 
compensate for the default risk, until a confidence crisis occurs. Lengthening and 
balancing the maturity structure of government debt can reduce this premium [B]. 
Both [A] and [B] imply a drop in the real yield of bonds as maturity 
lengthens, and this is empirically assessed in the next section employing the Turkish 
data. 
2.3. Empirical Analysis 
 
Based on Section 2.2, a negative relationship between the return and maturity 
of public debt is tested empirically in this section of the essay. The evidence reveals 
a statistically significant and negative relationship between return and maturity, as 
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presented in subsections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5. However, before proceeding with my 
estimates, I introduce my estimation strategy in subsections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 in 
the order to (i) distinguish the properties of the auction and monthly data sets that I 
employ as well as the variable definitions, (ii) divide of the whole sample range into 
sub-samples, (iii) estimate the technique and the form of the specification. 
2.3.1. Data Sets and Variables 
 
My empirical analysis is based on two types of data covering the period from 
July 1988 to December 20046. The first set, auction data, is based on the 
observations for each auction and compiled from the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey and the State Planning Organization.7 The basic variables in this data set are 
the nominal interest rate on each auction quoted monthly8 ( auctionR ), and the 
maturity of each auction ( auctionM ) measured in years9. The real return on each 
auction is computed by deflating the nominal rates by the seasonally adjusted rate of 
the WPI (Wholesale Price Index, 1987=100) inflation (pi ), the rate of local currency 
depreciation ( ρ ), and the monthly quoted interbank interest rate ( i ) corresponding 
                                                
6
 Auction data is available after 1985; however, the availability of the deflating variables that are used 
in my estimations restricts the start date of the usable data set to July-1988. Specifically, the interbank 
market has been operational only after this date. I end the data set in December 2004, but especially 
focus on the data prior to June 2001, which corresponds to the date of a high volume swap of treasury 
bonds with the public institutions and the public sector banks. This swap was aimed at handling the 
operational losses of various banks that were taken over by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund 
(SDIF) following the February 2001 financial crisis. Afterwards, the denomination of the debt 
changed and the maturity was lengthened.  Since the default, exchange rate and inflation risk 
compositions of the government debt changed considerably after that, the main focus of the study is 
on the before-2001 episode. 
7
 In this essay, I only include the treasury auctions in Turkish lira denominated bills and bonds and 
exclude foreign exchange denominated and inflation indexed bills and bonds.  The reason for this 
exclusion is that neither foreign exchange denominated nor inflation indexed assets were traded in 
secondary markets regularly (thus these bills and bonds had high liquidity premiums) and the 
Treasury was often reluctant to issue these bills and bonds due to their exchange rate or inflation risks 
for a significant portion of my sample span. 
8
 The monthly equivalent of the auction (simple) interest rates is computed by dividing the per annum 
figures by 12. The official convention for reporting auction interest rates is to report the simple, rather 
than compound, figures. I follow the same convention in this study as well. 
9
 Following Grabbe (1996), I took one year as 360 calendar days. 
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to the month in which the auctions are held. The rationale for using these three 
deflators originates from the fact that inflation and currency depreciation affect the 
intertemporal allocation of resources for domestic agents and the real return on 
domestic bonds for foreign investors. Similarly, the interbank interest rate is taken as 
a benchmark by domestic investors when they bid for treasury auctions. The rate of 
depreciation is computed as the percentage change of the Turkish lira value of a 
currency basket that is composed of 1 US dollar and 0.77 euro (prior to the 
circulation of euro, 1 US dollar and 1.5 Deutsche mark), which is the official 
exchange rate basket that the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey follows for its 
operations. 
 The deflated (real) auction interest rates that are used in this essay are as 
follows. The real interest rate, piAuctionr , is defined as )1/()( pipi +−
auctionR . 1−piAuctionr  is 
defined as )1/()( 11 −− +− pipiauctionR  where 1−pi  is the previous month's rate of 
inflation, and it is used as an instrumental variable. When ρ  and i , instead of pi , are 
used to obtain the real interest rate measures10, the resulting real interest rates are 
denoted as ρAuctionr  and 
i
Auctionr , respectively. I have also defined 1−
ρ
Auctionr  and 1−
i
Auctionr  
for 1−piAuctionr , where the first two are the notational convention for the last one, but the 
depreciation and interbank rate were used rather than inflation. 
                                                
10
 The reader will realize that my choice of deflators, while obtaining the real interest rate measures, 
stems from three important economic constructs, such that the choices of seasonally adjusted rate of 
WPI inflation, the rate of currency depreciation and the interbank overnight interest rate are linked 
with the Fisher Equation, Uncovered Interest Parity condition and a more general Financing 
condition, respectively. The Fisher Equation relates nominal interest rates to the inflation rate. In its 
strong form, there is a one-to-one relationship between these rates -- thus the real interest rate is 
constant. Then uncovered interest rate parity condition suggests that the interest rate difference 
between domestic and foreign countries is a function of depreciation.  One may assume that the 
domestic interest rate is determined by depreciation if the domestic interest rates are considerably 
higher and more volatile than foreign interest rates. Lastly, the financing condition dictates the long-
term rates as a function of short terms due to the Expectation Theory of the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates. 
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 The auction data set does not have a regular periodicity; therefore, inferences 
from the auction data might be subject to criticisms such as, (1) the auction-based 
data set that we employ is not adequately balanced (e.g. there are some months with 
no treasury auctions), (2) the frequency of auctions in different months is not 
necessarily the same11, and (3) the volume of borrowing is not the same for every 
single auction. In order to handle these potential criticisms, we estimate the interest 
rate-maturity relationship by using monthly data. The nominal interest rate quoted 
monthly and the monthly average maturity are denoted by tR  and tM , respectively. 
Explicitly, tR  is the monthly interest rate on treasury auctions, calculated for each 
month as a weighted average of the interest rates of the treasury auctions held in that 
particular month, where the weights are chosen as the volume of borrowing in each 
auction. Similarly, the maturity figures are obtained as averages from the original 
auction data. For the other variables, such as the rate of seasonally adjusted WPI 
inflation and the rate of currency depreciation, the usual conventions are followed. 
The interbank interest rate figures are taken from the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey, quoted annually. In addition, tpi , tρ  and ti  are the monthly counterparts of 
pi , ρ  and i  of the auction data set. Then, my real return measures in the monthly 
data set are pitr , ρtr , and itr , standing for the monthly nominal interest rate deflated 
by the monthly rate of inflation, the monthly rate of currency depreciation, and the 
monthly quoted interbank interest rate respectively. In the case of pitr , the formula 
)1/()( tttR pipi +−  is used to deflate the nominal interest rate.  For ρtr  and itr , the 
                                                
11
 Owing to this imbalance, rate of inflation, rate of currency depreciation and interbank interest rates 
may be overemphasized for months with more treasury auctions and simply be ignored for the months 
with no treasury auctions. 
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depreciation rate and the interbank interest rate are employed as deflators, instead of 
the monthly inflation rate.  tM  is the maturity measured in years. 
2.3.2. Choice of Sample Periods and Descriptive Statistics of Data 
 
The whole sample of my analysis covers the period from July 1988 to 
December 2004. However, the Turkish economy experienced two severe financial 
crises within this period, which may alter the quality of empirical analysis. This 
makes us regenerate my estimates for some sub-samples to ensure stability. Indeed, I 
have performed the Chow breakpoint tests in order to assess the robustness of my 
specifications between these crises. These tests gave support to the segmentation of 
the sample span as presented in this sub-section. 
The first big crisis in recent Turkish economic history, namely the 1994 
crisis, started in January 1994 and led to the announcement of a new stabilization 
program in April 1994, and its devastating effects did not disappear until 1995. The 
second crisis, which was even more devastating, occurred in February 2001. 
However, the vulnerability of the Turkish economy had increased considerably 
before that, namely in November 2000 after the financial collapse of a medium-sized 
commercial bank.12 In May 2001, the 2001 macroeconomic stabilization program, 
which was also supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was 
introduced. 
Given the availability of data and the crises experience of the Turkish 
economy, I have designated my sub-samples as [1] July 1988-May 2001, [2] January 
1995- October 2000 and [3] June 2001-December 2004. The episode from July 1988 
                                                
12
 The management of that bank was taken over by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
Although there had been other takeovers before November 2000, they did not create a severe impact. 
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to May 2001 runs from the beginning of my data to the start of the 2001 
macroeconomic stabilization program. However, it includes both the 1994 and the 
2001 financial crises; therefore, it is likely that the estimated econometric 
relationship is subject to change within the episode. The January 1995-October 2000 
period allows us to avoid the effects of above-mentioned crises on my estimates. The 
third sub-sample covers the part of the data set after June 2001. Thus, it includes no 
crisis effects and reflects the developments in the last three years, which helped 
reduce financial stress and enhance macroeconomic stability (CBRT, 2004, 2005). 
In sum, the first sub-sample corresponds to a period dominated by financial 
stress and crises; the second sub-sample can be marked as a between-crises period 
that is still subject to high financial stress; and the last sub-sample is characterized by 
successful stabilization efforts. 
Table 2-1 (auction data) and Table 2-2 (monthly data) report the descriptive 
statistics of the data for the whole- and sub-sample periods. Sample means and the 
standard deviations suggest that the level and variability of the interest rates (the 
auction as well as its deflated measures) have almost always been high for my 
samples, especially for the whole sample and sub-sample [1].  
Among descriptive statistics, Jarque-Bera test statistics might deserve special 
attention. Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 suggest that majority of the variables display 
normal distributions in sub-sample [2] and sub-sample [3], but not in the whole 
sample or in sub-sample [1]. Indeed, excess kurtosis (i.e. kurtosis above a value of 3) 
is observed for most of my series in the whole sample and in sub-sample [1]. For 
these sample ranges, I can hardly talk about the normality of my data. However, in 
sub-samples [2] and [3], the data set displays normality with only minor exceptions. 
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Non-normality of some of the variables is also reported in earlier empirical 
evidence on Turkey.  For example, Berument and Gunay (2003) reports the ARCH 
effect13 in exchange rate; and Berument and Malatyali (2001) reports the ARCH 
effect in inflation. Aydin (2004) studies the variants of ARCH models on interest 
rates and suggests the existence of significant ARCH effects. Since I employ these 
variables in my study, ARCH effects are expected in my deflated measures of the 
real return, simply ruling out the normality of series. However, the incorporation of 
ARCH effects into my investigation of the yield curve is left for further studies. 
The levels of the data series and their differences are plotted in Figure 
2-1&Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3&Figure 2-4 respectively. Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 
clearly reflect the trends in data series and display the effects of the financial crises 
on my variables. It can be noted that none of the series demonstrate an explosive 
behavior.  Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4, along with Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 also 
demonstrate the time changing variability of the series.  
2.3.3. Estimation Technique and Form of Estimating Equation 
 
A problem of simultaneity is inherent in the data due to the very nature of the 
treasury-auction process, which determines the maturities and interest rates 
simultaneously. Under these circumstances, the Ordinary Least Squares estimates 
will be biased. The Instrumental Variable (or Two-Stage Regression) (IV) technique 
was used to account for this problem in obtaining my parameter estimates. 
The first Equation form that I investigate is given in (Eq. 2-1): 
(Eq. 2-1)   Real Return= εαα ++ Maturity10  
                                                
13
 ARCH stands for AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and measures the volatility and 
risks in terms of the dynamics of the conditional variance of returns over time. Failing to reject the 
existence of ARCH effects within a series is an indication of heteroskedasticity in that series. 
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where the Real Return, )]1/()[( XXReturnNominal +− , is obtained as described in 
subsection 2.3.1 and Maturity is measured in years. X  is a deflating variable, such 
as the rate of inflation, the depreciation rate of the local currency or the interbank 
interest rate. This form simply helps us to obtain the relationship between real 
interest rates and maturity. 
 On the other hand, it is probable that deflating variables, such as rate of 
inflation, rate of currency depreciation and interbank interest rate, do not affect the 
real returns in a one-to-one manner, i.e. as in the numerator of the Real Return 
expression in (Eq. 2-1). Therefore, I have also employed a second Equation form, in 
which the deflating variables might have coefficients other than unity. This 
relaxation is expressed by means of (Eq. 2-2): 
(Eq. 2-2)   Nominal Return= εααα +++ XMaturity 210  
where Nominal Return is the nominal interest rate.  (Eq. 2-1) and (Eq. 2-2) are the 
generic Equations that assess the basis for my analysis in the following subsections, 
where the latter is motivated by Tobin (1965). This suggests that nominal interest 
rates increase less than the amount by which inflation increases, under the 
assumption that money and capital are the only forms of wealth and the economy has 
decreasing returns to scale production function. Under these circumstances, if the 
opportunity cost of holding money increases due to higher inflation, then money 
holdings decrease and capital stock increases. The assumption of decreasing returns 
to scale causes the interest rate to increase less than inflation; therefore, 2α  becomes 
less than unity. Regarding how 2α  can be less than unity in the case of X  being the 
interbank interest rate; one might see Cook and Hahn (1989) and Berument and 
Froyen (2005) for empirical support. Finally, in the case of the local currency 
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depreciation, the deflating effect of depreciation can be disproportionate due to the 
dynamic effects of risk premia (see CBRT, 2003). 
While estimating (Eq. 2-1) and (Eq. 2-2) for different sub-samples, the 
reliability of the estimates is a key consideration. Although the IV technique grants 
that the estimated coefficients are unbiased, the significance of the estimates may be 
mismeasured if I do not use robust standard errors. In order to avoid such a shortfall, 
I have employed the Newey-West procedure for non-spherical robust disturbances. 
In the next subsection, I present my analysis based on auction data and (Eq. 
2-1). Then my results on monthly data under (Eq. 2-1) and (Eq. 2-2) are presented. 
2.3.4. Estimates Based on Auction Data 
 
Estimated coefficients based on the auction data for the return-maturity 
relationship are reported in Table 2-3. In the first column, my dependent variable is 
pi
Auctionr , which is regressed on constant term and bond maturity. The instrumental 
variables are the constant term, the first three lags of 1−piAuctionr and the lag of 
auctionM . 
In the second and the third columns, ρAuctionr  and 
i
Auctionr  are used as the left hand 
side variables. When the nominal interest rates are deflated with the depreciation rate 
and the interbank rate, the instrument sets are modified accordingly. That is, 1−ρAuctionr  
and 1−iAuctionr  are used as instruments when 
ρ
Auctionr  and 
i
Auctionr  are used as the 
dependent variables. 
 Table 2-3 suggests – for the whole sample – that there is a statistically 
significant14 and negative relationship between real interest rates on auctions and the 
                                                
14
 The level of significance is 5% throughout the chapter, unless otherwise mentioned. 
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maturities of newly issued debt, as I hypothesized before. Moreover, the largest 
coefficient in absolute value is observed when the interest rate is deflated with the 
depreciation rate. The same observation is valid for sub-sample [1], namely for July 
1988-May 2001 auctions. When the focus is shifted to the between-crises episode 
(sub-sample[2]), maturity remains statistically significant with a negative sign. 
Furthermore, it possesses the largest absolute coefficient when the nominal interest 
rate is deflated by the rate of inflation. 
The post-2001 sub-sample displays a different overall picture of the yield 
curve. When the nominal interest rate is deflated by inflation rate or rate of currency 
depreciation, the slope of the estimated yield curve turns out to be positive; whereas, 
these estimates of the slope are not statistically significant at the 10% level. This is 
possibly due to the change in the exchange rate regime. Although the exchange rate 
was a useful indicator of expected inflation before the 2001 financial crisis, it is not 
so after February 2001, when the exchange rate was allowed to float freely. 
It is worth noting that the slope of the yield curve remains negative and 
statistically significant for the post-2001 sub-sample, when I compute the real 
auction return in excess of the interbank interest rate. This possibly reflects the 
change in people’s perception of the economic dynamics after May 2001. 
The above-mentioned change from pre-2001 to post-2001 episode is worth 
further elaboration. In the absence of a confidence crisis, an upward-sloping yield 
curve is associated with the expectations of ‘increasing inflation’; i.e. investors 
require higher nominal returns if they believe that the future course of inflation will 
trend upwards. However, the presence of a confidence crisis (e.g. low confidence) 
reverses this picture, as elaborated in Section 2. That is, there is no period before 
2001 during which inflation continuously falls, and this should normally imply an 
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upward-sloping yield curve. However, the risk profile of the Turkish TL-
denominated domestic debt causes the slope to be downwards, rather than upwards, 
in the pre-2001 episode. 
In the post-2001 episode, both the actual consumer price inflation and 
inflation expectations have been steadily falling. This is clearly a textbook case of a 
downward-sloping yield curve. My empirical estimates, however, reveal the 
opposite, probably indicating the continuation of the high-risk profile of the 
Treasury. 
2.3.5. Estimates Based on Monthly Data 
 
My auction-based estimates depict a negative linkage between the interest 
rate of government auctions and auction maturity, confirming my theoretical finding 
in Section 2 for the pre-2001. Thus, this sub-section provides evidence from the 
monthly data. Due to the lack of treasury auctions in December 1999 and December 
2000, there are two missing values in the maturity series. The State Planning 
Organization provided observations for those months by substituting information on 
the Treasury's sale of bonds to public institutions. This anomaly of data is handled by 
defining intercept dummy variables for each of the two months. These dummy 
variables are included in both the functional specification and the set of instrumental 
variables, so as to control for the effect of missing observations. 
 In my first series of regressions, I use pitr , ρtr , and itr  as the left-hand-side 
variables. The set of regressors include the constant term, maturity tM , and the 
dummy variables for December 1999 (D9912) and December 2000 (D0012). I use 
the constant term, two dummy variables (D9912 and D0012) and one to four lags of 
the ti , tpi , and tρ  as my instrumental variables. The estimates in Table 2-4 suggest 
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– for the whole sample – a negative relationship between real bond return and 
maturity, supporting my previous findings in the auction-based regressions. When 
the nominal interest rate is deflated with the inflation rate, the slope estimate of the 
yield curve is significant at 1% and when it is deflated by the interbank interest rate, 
the significance is at the 10% level. Although the yield curve has a negative slope for 
ρ
tr , this estimate is insignificant. Table 2-4 further replicates these estimations for 
my three sub-samples. In sub-sample [1], I observe a significantly negative slope 
estimate in the first column only. The real interest rate, computed using the 
depreciation rate and the interbank interest rate, does not have a statistically 
significant association with maturity in sub-sample [1]. 
 Estimates for sub-sample [2] suggest a negatively sloped yield curve, 
regardless of the deflating variable. All these estimates are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. One may realize the disappearance of the insignificance after excluding 
the crises from the sample. This is mainly due to the fact that during the crisis 
episodes, the series under consideration display erratic behavior and act as outliers. 
 The last column of Table 2-4 closely mimics those of Table 2-3; e.g. the 
estimated yield curves attain positive but insignificant slopes when inflation and 
depreciation rates are used as deflators in sub-sample [3]. The case of the interbank 
interest rate still suggests a negatively sloped yield curve after May 2001. 
 One may be skeptical of the regressions presented in Table 2-4 since I impose 
a coefficient of unity on the deflating variable in each of the regressions. Following 
Tobin (1965), Cook and Hahn (1989) and inflation risk premium arguments that a 
change in the deflating variables may not be reflected in the nominal interest rate on 
a one-to-one basis15, I estimate another set of regressions in which the monthly 
                                                
15
 See Berument and Malatyali (2001) for elaboration on this for Turkey. 
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nominal interest rate ( tR ) is regressed on the constant term, tM , D9912, D0012, and 
either tpi , tρ , or ti , and where the set of instrumental variables includes the constant 
term, dummy variables D9912 and D0012, one to three lags of ti , tpi , tρ . My IV 
estimates of these specifications are reported in Table 2-5, which suggests the 
previously observed negative relationship between interest rates and maturity 
variables with tighter levels of significance.16 However, there are some changes in 
the pattern of slope estimates across sub-samples and across deflating variables. For 
instance, the whole sample suggests significantly negative estimates in all three 
specifications. In contrast to what I have observed in Table 2-4, in Table 2-5 these 
significant and negative estimates are maintained in sub-sample [1]. Moreover, sub-
sample [2] and [3] also suggested negatively sloped yield curves for all specifications 
except for the third in sub-sample [2]. In sum, the overall picture suggests a 
negatively sloping yield curve. 
 Due to the persistence of the variables of concern, there might exist a 
problem of serial correlation in my estimates. One may realize that the lagged values 
of the dependent variable have not been included in either Table 2-4 or Table 2-5. 
This kind of specification may raise suspicion about the robustness of the results. For 
instance, if real interest rates and maturity are both serially correlated variables, 
estimating an Equation without a lagged dependent variable, or without correction 
for serial correlation, may make the maturity variable statistically significant only 
because it is a proxy for the lagged dependent variable or the serial correlation 
correction.17 Consequently, I have regenerated my specifications in Table 2-4 and 
Table 2-5 by adding three lagged values of dependent and deflating variables as 
                                                
16
 The same estimation could not be performed for the specifications in the previous subsection due to 
the structure of the auction data set. 
17
 Hamilton (1994, pp.557-62) can be seen for a discussion of these issues.  
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regressors.18 Table 2-6 and Table 2-7, are the counterparts of Table 2-4 and Table 
2-5, respectively.19 
 The estimates of Table 2-6 suggest the same negative relationship between 
maturity and real interest rates. However, the level of statistical significance has 
dropped considerably. For the whole sample, maturity has negative coefficients in all 
cases, but they are not statistically significant. In sub-sample [1], the coefficient of 
maturity is negative and significant only for pitr .  For ρtr  and itr  it is negative as well, 
yet not statistically significant. Sub-sample [2] suggests a similar pattern of 
estimates, although the slope of the yield curve is smaller in magnitude. In the last 
sub-sample, namely June 2001-December 2004 episode, for pitr  and ρtr  the 
coefficient of maturity turns positive, but these positive estimates are not statistically 
significant. For itr , the maturity variable has a negative and significant coefficient 
estimate, implying a negatively sloped yield curve. 
Similar to the relationship between Table 2-6 and Table 2-4, Table 2-7 
verifies the findings of Table 2-5. Indeed, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
as a regressor remedied the residuals’ autocorrelation problem in practically all the 
specifications and sub-samples, without altering the key findings.20 Although the 
aforementioned non-normality of data in the whole sample and in sub-sample [1] 
affected the normality of the residuals in the estimations for these sample episodes, it 
did not change the quality of my findings.21 
                                                
18
 The choice of three lags is due to the frequency of the financial statements prepared for the majority 
of financial institutions in Turkey. The basic results were robust for a set of alternative lag structures. 
19
 I have also performed the Ljung-Box (1978) tests (up to 6 lags) and could reject the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation for all specifications reported in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 (not reported). 
20
 Based on the Ljung-Box (1978) tests. 
21
 Based on Jarque-Bera (1987) tests. 
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 As mentioned previously, I have also assessed the robustness of my 
specifications to the existence of the financial crises in my sample span. The Chow 
test statistics, which are presented in Table 2-8, provide support for my segmentation 
of the whole sample into sub-samples. 
 All in all, the negative linkage between interest rates and maturity that I have 
revealed using auction data, presented in Table 2-3, remained intact despite changes 
in the data structure, i.e. using monthly data instead of auction data, and despite 
different specifications, i.e. specifications that include, versus those that do not 
include, the lagged values of the dependent variable as a right-hand-side variable. 
However, the signs and significance levels of my parameter estimates do differ in the 
pre-2001 and post-2001 samples. 
The findings for the pre-2001 sub-samples are in line with my elaboration 
and interpretation of Alesina et al (1990), the model that is presented in Section 2, as 
well as Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina et al. (1992), Calvo and Guidotti (1992) 
and Missale and Blanchard (1994). 
2.4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
2.4.1. Discussion 
 
In sub-section 3.4, the auction-based estimates suggested that the slope of the 
yield curve is negative for Turkish treasury auctions, which is repeatedly revealed in 
the whole sample, in the July 1988-May 2001 and in the January 1995-October 2000 
samples. However, I observe a change in this pattern after June 2001, when the 
maturity variable attains a significantly negative coefficient estimate only when the 
nominal interest rate on auctions is deflated by the interbank interest rate to obtain 
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the real interest rate. Maturity does not have a significant coefficient in the other 
regressions. At this point, it is important to summarize to what extent my empirical 
findings remain intact and where they display a pattern change. 
 First of all, the findings on auction data are further supported by my monthly 
estimates in sub-section 2.3.5, regardless of the relationship estimated for nominal or 
real measures of return. That is, whether I estimate (Eq. 2-1) or (Eq. 2-2) of 
subsection 2.3.3, I have revealed the same evidence as I had on auction data. 
 Secondly, the between-crises sub-sample is the most stable episode in terms 
of the durability of empirical findings. This situation augments my views on the low 
public confidence in the governments’ debt management policies in Turkey for the 
1995-2000 period. 
 Thirdly, the post-2001 May sample yields a radical pattern change. In most 
cases, in the post-2001 episode I observe that the real auction return computed by 
using the interbank interest rate is still negatively associated with maturity of debt. 
However, the sign of the coefficient of maturity turns positive in other cases, along 
with lower statistical significance. That is, the people’s perception with regard to the 
rate of inflation and the depreciation of the Turkish lira must have changed after May 
2001. In the light of recent Turkish policy making experience, this might be intuitive. 
Indeed, the policy view of the Central Bank of Turkey toward reducing inflation was 
formulated and has been implemented in terms of the “implicit inflation targeting” 
framework and the Bank was set to an “independent” position starting in April-May 
2001. After this date, the Bank manifested its fundamental goal as the stability of 
prices. The exchange rate regime, in the same episode was set as the “floating 
exchange rate” regime.22 Eventually, the changes in the public perception of inflation 
                                                
22
 The exchange rate regime is determined by the government, together with the Central Bank of 
Turkey, and implemented by the Central Bank, as required by the Central Bank Law. 
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and currency depreciation can be considered as a consequence of these changes in 
the monetary policy making framework.23 
2.4.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
On the theoretical front, the further elaboration of the Alesina et al (1990) 
model, as presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1, suggests a negative relationship 
between the treasury auction interest rates and auction maturity, under the 
assumption of a nonzero default risk and confidence crises. My study provides 
empirical evidence from the Turkish economy on this relationship. I have performed 
my analysis through two types of data sets. First, I have used a data set that contains 
the data from each treasury auction. Second, I have used monthly data, which was 
obtained from the first data set through aggregation. 
The finding of a downward sloping yield curve is quite consistent with some 
specific conditions of the Turkish economy, such as chronic-high and volatile levels 
of inflation, a high and volatile default risk, frequent occurrences of financial crisis, 
an inflation-devaluation cycle, and the low credibility of policy makers, specifically 
until mid-2001. Due to real return and default risks, those conditions shape the 
maturity-return relationship in a different way from the case for developed countries.  
In this setup, the low credibility of policy makers makes shorter auction maturities 
and higher interest rates necessary. Consequently, once the market is unable to 
generate its long-term assets, returns on treasury bills are pushed far above the 
                                                
23
 It should also be noted that the primary surplus target of the stabilization program started in June 
2001, which is also supported by the International Monetary Fund, helped reducing the need to 
generate new debt. As the expenditures of the political authority are radically restricted, the skepticism 
regarding the roll-over of existing debt stock was limited after May 2001. Another important 
ingredient of the recent political climate of Turkey can be marked as the switch from a sequence of 
coalitional governments to a majority cabinet in the Grand National Assembly. These observations 
highlight the reduction of fiscal risks and political uncertainties. 
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generally prescribed levels. As far as the outcome is concerned, it can be argued that 
such management of debt is expected to be self-promoting and further 
unsustainability of debt is unavoidable. The post-2001 developments should be 
studied in more depth in order to reach a better understanding of possible changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. This may gain feasibility over time, as more 
observations are accumulated. 
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Table 2-1: Descriptive Statistics (Auction Data) 
 
pi
Auctionr  
ρ
Auctionr  
i
Auctionr  R  pi  ρ  i  auctionM  
Whole Sample: Jul 1988-Dec 2004 Auctions 
Mean 0.0221 0.0291 0.0069 0.0612 0.0385 0.0326 0.0546 0.6591 
Median 0.0198 0.0268 0.0082 0.0590 0.0364 0.0336 0.0519 0.5056 
Maximum 0.1179 0.2345 0.1141 0.1872 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 3.0417 
Minimum -0.1389 -0.2443 -0.2316 0.0090 -0.0061 -0.0726 0.0159 0.0778 
Std. Dev. 0.0231 0.0420 0.0262 0.0249 0.0235 0.0436 0.0365 0.4528 
Skewness -0.1267 0.0205 -3.0976 0.7225 2.6758 2.5376 4.5024 1.9923 
Kurtosis 8.5905 10.5504 26.1054 4.1541 24.8341 24.3739 29.0538 9.4267 
Jarque-Bera* 1075.26 1957.37 19646.84 117.43 17350.87 16569.33 26089.46 1963.18 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
 
Sub-sample [1]: Jul 1988-May 2001 Auctions 
Mean 0.0227 0.0282 0.0070 0.0672 0.0438 0.0392 0.0606 0.6538 
Median 0.0205 0.0255 0.0088 0.0636 0.0406 0.0362 0.0550 0.5056 
Maximum 0.1179 0.2345 0.1141 0.1872 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 3.0417 
Minimum -0.1389 -0.2443 -0.2316 0.0235 -0.0003 -0.0726 0.0180 0.0778 
Std. Dev. 0.0248 0.0403 0.0294 0.0237 0.0225 0.0401 0.0389 0.4597 
Skewness -0.1857 0.0865 -2.8006 0.8463 3.6490 4.1172 4.4317 2.1971 
Kurtosis 8.1853 14.6793 20.9505 4.3611 33.3336 39.3684 26.2100 10.6743 
Jarque-Bera* 721.81 3643.96 9443.88 125.99 25997.59 37137.01 16486.12 2088.68 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 
 
Sub-sample [2]: Jan 1995-Oct 2000 Auctions 
Mean 0.0340 0.0362 0.0177 0.0765 0.0412 0.0390 0.0578 0.7580 
Median 0.0329 0.0355 0.0167 0.0805 0.0418 0.0403 0.0613 0.5833 
Maximum 0.1094 0.0869 0.0563 0.1257 0.0700 0.0836 0.0886 3.0333 
Minimum -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0082 0.0235 0.0088 0.0046 0.0216 0.1389 
Std. Dev. 0.0196 0.0173 0.0130 0.0219 0.0140 0.0158 0.0128 0.5390 
Skewness 0.5746 0.2210 0.2716 -0.7831 0.0375 0.0980 -0.7804 2.0333 
Kurtosis 3.6040 2.6455 2.6704 3.3856 2.3604 3.0581 3.8208 8.2226 
Jarque-Bera* 15.24 2.90 3.65 23.52 3.75 0.38 28.12 396.13 
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.16) (0.00) (0.15) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 217 
 
Sub-sample [3]: Jun 2001-Dec 2004 Auctions 
Mean 0.0197 0.0324 0.0066 0.0402 0.0202 0.0095 0.0334 0.6774 
Median 0.0176 0.0406 0.0053 0.0429 0.0157 -0.0048 0.0367 0.5444 
Maximum 0.0617 0.1295 0.0253 0.0735 0.0594 0.1094 0.0543 2.0222 
Minimum -0.0476 -0.0748 -0.0382 0.0090 -0.0061 -0.0600 0.0159 0.2333 
Std. Dev. 0.0159 0.0474 0.0067 0.0160 0.0166 0.0473 0.0120 0.4283 
Skewness 0.0647 -0.1809 -0.8938 -0.0246 0.6705 0.6579 -0.0005 1.1141 
Kurtosis 4.3100 2.4225 12.7847 1.6394 2.7198 2.3802 1.6705 3.7157 
Jarque-Bera* 13.21 3.54 754.38 14.13 14.31 16.13 13.48 41.76 
 (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 
* p-values of Jarque-Bera tests are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics (Monthly Data) 
 
pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  tR  tpi  tρ  ti  tM  
Whole Sample: Jul 1988-Dec 2004 
Mean 0.0226 0.0267 0.0072 0.0616 0.0384 0.0355 0.0548 0.7359 
Median 0.0224 0.0287 0.0089 0.0606 0.0361 0.0344 0.0524 0.6962 
Maximum 0.0899 0.2036 0.0862 0.1350 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 2.0278 
Minimum -0.1284 -0.2350 -0.2200 0.0190 -0.0061 -0.0726 0.0159 0.1231 
Std. Dev. 0.0226 0.0395 0.0273 0.0240 0.0257 0.0486 0.0377 0.3432 
Skewness -1.2090 -1.3670 -4.3322 0.3030 3.8165 3.6935 5.0230 1.5286 
Kurtosis 12.3294 15.2388 32.5747 2.7104 34.1263 30.2616 35.2518 6.3812 
Jarque-Bera* 766.28 1297.42 7835.34 3.72 8473.65 6581.56 9414.09 171.42 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
 
Sub-sample [1]: Jul 1988-May 2001 
Mean 0.0236 0.0253 0.0074 0.0676 0.0434 0.0428 0.0608 0.7438 
Median 0.0236 0.0277 0.0111 0.0675 0.0402 0.0382 0.0556 0.6825 
Maximum 0.0899 0.2036 0.0862 0.1350 0.2677 0.4445 0.3633 2.0278 
Minimum -0.1284 -0.2350 -0.2200 0.0275 -0.0003 -0.0726 0.0180 0.1231 
Std. Dev. 0.0244 0.0379 0.0308 0.0225 0.0255 0.0468 0.0401 0.3704 
Skewness -1.3197 -1.9733 -3.8953 0.2918 4.7055 5.1445 4.9608 1.5150 
Kurtosis 11.6317 21.3916 25.9691 2.6793 40.6611 40.9216 31.9715 5.8162 
Jarque-Bera* 526.18 2285.13 3799.26 2.86 9732.23 9971.11 6056.53 110.52 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sample Size 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 
 
Sub-sample [2]: Jan 1995-Oct 2000 
Mean 0.0337 0.0361 0.0183 0.0765 0.0415 0.0390 0.0571 0.8855 
Median 0.0344 0.0368 0.0189 0.0813 0.0410 0.0419 0.0601 0.8000 
Maximum 0.0770 0.0680 0.0495 0.1142 0.0700 0.0836 0.0886 2.0278 
Minimum -0.0214 -0.0048 -0.0118 0.0275 0.0088 0.0046 0.0216 0.2389 
Std. Dev. 0.0193 0.0166 0.0130 0.0222 0.0142 0.0154 0.0125 0.4699 
Skewness -0.0452 -0.2376 -0.1293 -0.9708 0.0524 -0.0623 -0.8550 0.9282 
Kurtosis 3.1938 2.7354 2.6869 3.1986 2.3450 3.0480 3.8824 3.1416 
Jarque-Bera* 0.13 0.86 0.48 11.11 1.28 0.05 10.80 10.11 
 (0.94) (0.65) (0.79) (0.00) (0.53) (0.97) (0.00) (0.01) 
Sample Size 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
 
Sub-sample [3]: Jun 2001-Dec 2004 
Mean 0.0191 0.0321 0.0064 0.0399 0.0205 0.0094 0.0333 0.7074 
Median 0.0175 0.0404 0.0056 0.0441 0.0157 -0.0048 0.0367 0.7222 
Maximum 0.0544 0.1215 0.0196 0.0642 0.0594 0.1094 0.0543 1.2028 
Minimum -0.0133 -0.0730 -0.0004 0.0190 -0.0061 -0.0600 0.0159 0.3306 
Std. Dev. 0.0137 0.0449 0.0049 0.0155 0.0170 0.0463 0.0124 0.2200 
Skewness 0.3544 -0.1168 1.0167 -0.1221 0.5987 0.6608 0.0489 -0.0006 
Kurtosis 3.2694 2.4639 3.6303 1.4426 2.5470 2.4093 1.6387 2.2213 
Jarque-Bera* 1.03 0.61 8.12 4.45 2.94 3.75 3.34 1.09 
 (0.60) (0.74) (0.02) (0.11) (0.23) (0.15) (0.19) (0.58) 
Sample Size 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
* p-values of Jarque-Bera tests are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-3: Real Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Auction Data 
Independent 
Variables 
pi
Auctionr  
ρ
Auctionr  
i
Auctionr  
Whole Sample: Jul 1988-Dec 2004 Auctions 
Constant 0.138*** 
(2.805) 
0.159*** 
(2.203) 
0.0207*** 
(3.747) 
auctionM  
-0.176*** 
(-2.354) 
-0.197* 
(-1.811) 
-0.0209*** 
(-2.549) 
Sub-sample [1]: Jul 1988-May 2001 Auctions 
Constant 0.096*** 
(4.375) 
0.137*** 
(3.602) 
0.0202*** 
(3.508) 
auctionM  
-0.112*** 
(-3.349) 
-0.166*** 
(-2.895) 
-0.0202*** 
(-2.403) 
Sub-sample [2]: Jan 1995-Oct 2000 Auctions 
Constant 0.093*** 
(7.359) 
0.072 
(8.337) 
0.029 
(9.634) 
auctionM  
-0.078*** 
(-4.564) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.380) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.896) 
Sub-sample [3]: Jun 2001-Dec 2004 Auctions 
Constant 0.006 
(0.661) 
0.002 
(0.110) 
0.012*** 
(5.098) 
auctionM  
0.021 
(1.622) 
0.044 
(1.509) 
-0.0094*** 
(-2.544) 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the underlying standard 
errors are (White’s) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. (*), (**) and (***) correspond to statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 2-4: Real Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
Independent 
Variables 
pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  
Whole Sample: Jul 1988-Dec 2004 
Constant 0.069*** 
(3.220) 
0.087* 
(1.773) 
0.028*** 
(2.271) 
tM  -0.063*** (-2.242) 
-0.082 
(-1.265) 
-0.0289* 
(-1.737) 
D9912 0.031 
(0.949) 
0.067 
(0.873) 
0.014 
(0.757) 
D0012 0.012* 
(1.905) 
0.022 
(1.637) 
-0.109*** 
(-27.964) 
Sub-sample [1]: Jul 1988-May 2001 
Constant 0.071*** 
(3.668) 
0.092* 
(1.830) 
0.010 
(0.543) 
tM  -0.065*** (-2.475) 
-0.091 
(-1.367) 
-0.0024 
(-0.102) 
D9912 0.031 
(1.009) 
0.077 
(0.999) 
-0.017 
(-0.653) 
D0012 0.011* 
(1.663) 
0.026* 
(1.834) 
-0.115*** 
(-25.646) 
Sub-sample [2]: Jan 1995-Oct 2000 
Constant 0.088*** 
(5.818) 
0.067*** 
(5.729) 
0.027*** 
(7.621) 
tM  -0.061*** (-3.822) 
-0.035*** 
(-2.805) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.368) 
D9912 0.008 
(0.505) 
-0.004 
(-0.339) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.837) 
Sub-sample [3]: Jun 2001-Dec 2004 
Constant 0.016*** 
(2.273) 
-0.007 
(-0.263) 
0.014*** 
(6.041) 
tM  0.0036 (0.352) 
0.055 
(1.601) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.976) 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the underlying standard 
errors are (White’s) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. (*), (**) and (***) correspond to statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. D0012 is not usable in sub-sample [2]; and neither D9912 nor D0012 is usable in sub-sample [3] to 
avoid singularity. 
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Table 2-5: Nominal Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
Independent Variables tR  tR  tR  
Whole Sample: Jul 1988-Dec 2004 
Constant 0.124*** 
(5.017) 
0.162*** 
(7.947) 
0.111*** 
(5.272) 
tM  -0.111*** (-3.947) 
-0.146*** 
(-5.758) 
-0.098*** 
(-3.702) 
D9912 0.101*** 
(2.763) 
0.155*** 
(5.133) 
0.098*** 
(3.150) 
D0012 0.013*** 
(2.275) 
0.016*** 
(2.631) 
-0.042*** 
(-3.062) 
tpi  
0.488*** 
(3.111) 
 
 
 
 
tρ   
 
0.161* 
(1.909) 
 
 
ti   
 
 
 
0.387*** 
(4.153) 
Sub-sample [1]: Jul 1988-May 2001 
Constant 0.103*** 
(5.123) 
0.131*** 
(7.121) 
0.089*** 
(4.379) 
tM  -0.075*** (-3.337) 
-0.094*** 
(-4.029) 
-0.056*** 
(-2.208) 
D9912 0.055* 
(1.939) 
0.088*** 
(3.198) 
0.045 
(1.532) 
D0012 -0.00067 
(-0.129) 
-0.0027 
(-0.476) 
-0.050*** 
(-5.482) 
tpi  0.446*** (3.044) 
 
 
 
 
tρ   
 
0.125*** 
(2.057) 
 
 
ti   
 
 
 
0.331*** 
(5.193) 
Sub-sample [2]: Jan 1995-Oct 2000 
Constant 0.105*** 
(3.378) 
0.089*** 
(3.452) 
0.008 
(0.239) 
tM  -0.069*** (-3.288) 
-0.051*** 
(-2.712) 
-0.0149 
(-0.827) 
D9912 0.019 
(0.639) 
0.012 
(0.553) 
-0.017 
(-0.868) 
tpi  
0.780* 
(1.929) 
  
tρ   
 
0.831*** 
(2.672) 
 
ti   
 
 1.436*** 
(4.297) 
Sub-sample [3]: Jun 2001-Dec 2004 
Constant 0.081*** 
(4.726) 
0.107*** 
(8.360) 
0.016*** 
(2.230) 
tM  -0.061*** (-3.562) 
-0.092*** 
(-5.649) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.233) 
tpi  0.094 (0.390) 
 
 
 
 
tρ   
 
-0.231* 
(-1.836) 
 
 
ti   
 
 
 
1.019*** 
(12.248) 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters, where the underlying standard 
errors are (White’s) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. (*), (**) and (***) correspond to statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. D0012 is not usable in sub-sample [2]; and neither D9912 nor D0012 is usable in sub-sample [3] to 
avoid singularity. 
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Table 2-6: Real Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
 
Whole Sample 
 
Sub-sample [1] 
 Jul 1988-Dec 2004  Jul 1988-May 2001 
 pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  
 pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  
Constant 0.046* 
(1.795) 
0.067 
(1.282) 
0.061 
(1.244) 
 0.050*** 
(2.565) 
0.077 
(1.506) 
0.017 
(0.521) 
tM  -0.050 (-1.438) 
-0.068 
(-0.996) 
-0.080 
(-1.136) 
 -0.0552*** 
(-2.070) 
-0.0810 
(-1.245) 
-0.0178 
(-0.350) 
D9912 0.019 
(0.483) 
0.054 
(0.684) 
0.074 
(0.910) 
 0.024 
(0.797) 
0.070 
(0.957) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
D0012 0.016*** 
(2.132) 
0.020 
(1.413) 
-0.084*** 
(-4.741) 
 0.017*** 
(2.644) 
0.023* 
(1.762) 
-0.101*** 
(-5.760) 
pi
1−tr  
0.491*** 
(3.258) 
 
 
 
 
 0.475*** 
(3.181) 
 
 
 
 
pi
2−tr  
0.026 
(0.168) 
 
 
 
 
 0.018 
(0.119) 
 
 
 
 
pi
3−tr  
0.063 
(0.526) 
 
 
 
 
 0.085 
(0.806) 
 
 
 
 
ρ
1−tr  
 
 
0.441*** 
(2.822) 
 
 
  
 
0.531*** 
(2.556) 
 
 
ρ
2−tr  
 
 
-0.117 
(-0.778) 
 
 
  
 
-0.284 
(-1.641) 
 
 
ρ
3−tr  
 
 
0.050 
(0.479) 
 
 
  
 
0.097 
(0.793) 
 
 
i
tr 1−  
 
 
 
 
0.214 
(1.321) 
  
 
 
 
0.227 
(1.297) 
i
tr 2−  
 
 
 
 
0.432 
(1.282) 
  
 
 
 
0.340 
(1.166) 
i
tr 3−  
 
 
 
 
0.083 
(0.413) 
  
 
 
 
-0.045 
(-0.212) 
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Table 2-6: Real Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
(continued) 
 
Sub-sample [2] 
 
Sub-sample [3] 
 Jan 1995-Oct 2000  Jun 2001-Dec 2004 
 pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  
 pi
tr  
ρ
tr  
i
tr  
Constant 0.036*** 
(3.011) 
0.025*** 
(2.238) 
0.015 
(1.366) 
 0.006 
(1.207) 
-0.004 
(-0.153) 
0.010*** 
(2.313) 
tM  -0.0257*** (-2.402) 
-0.0142 
(-1.498) 
-0.0122 
(-1.060) 
 0.002 
(0.335) 
0.036 
(0.956) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.245) 
D9912 -0.018* 
(-1.887) 
-0.019*** 
(-2.062) 
-0.0088 
(-0.7966) 
    
D0012        
pi
1−tr  
0.448*** 
(2.314) 
   0.696*** 
(5.148) 
 
 
 
 
pi
2−tr  
0.134 
(0.714) 
   0.023 
(0.188) 
 
 
 
 
pi
3−tr  
0.015 
(0.099) 
   -0.122 
(-1.282) 
 
 
 
 
ρ
1−tr  
 0.221 
(1.337) 
   
 
0.318* 
(1.932) 
 
 
ρ
2−tr  
 0.254** 
(1.985) 
   
 
0.002 
(0.017) 
 
 
ρ
3−tr  
 0.165 
(1.364) 
   
 
-0.016 
(-0.155) 
 
 
i
tr 1−  
  0.469*** 
(3.388) 
  
 
 
 
0.627*** 
(4.529) 
i
tr 2−  
  0.059 
(0.333) 
  
 
 
 
-0.206 
(-1.579) 
i
tr 3−  
  0.194* 
(1.654) 
  
 
 
 
0.077 
(0.666) 
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Table 2-7: Nominal Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
 Whole Sample  Sub-sample [1] 
 Jul 1988-Dec 2004  Jul 1988-May 2001 
 
tR  tR  tR   tR  tR  tR  
Constant 0.005** 
(1.962) 
0.007*** 
(2.744) 
0.005 
(1.593) 
 0.010*** 
(2.608) 
0.009*** 
(2.981) 
0.007*** 
(2.331) 
tM  -0.005* (-1.806) 
-0.006** 
(-1.964) 
-0.005** 
(-2.018) 
 -0.0072*** 
(-2.243) 
-0.0065*** 
(-2.133) 
-0.0059** 
(-2.015) 
D9912 -0.014*** 
(-2.980) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.868) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.097) 
 -0.011*** 
(-2.417) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.543) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.774) 
D0012 0.008*** 
(9.083) 
0.008*** 
(8.939) 
-0.008 
(-0.945) 
 0.007*** 
(4.427) 
0.0077*** 
(4.448) 
-0.001 
(-0.105) 
1−tR  0.857*** (7.470) 
0.799*** 
(6.704) 
0.786*** 
(7.022) 
 0.845*** 
(6.969) 
0.766*** 
(5.343) 
0.748*** 
(6.557) 
2−tR  -0.163 (-1.034) 
-0.086 
(-0.587) 
-0.034 
(-0.218) 
 -0.147 
(-0.819) 
-0.076 
(-0.465) 
0.016 
(0.099) 
3−tR  0.190 (1.641) 
0.186* 
(1.710) 
0.137 
(1.419) 
 0.187 
(1.426) 
0.192 
(1.497) 
0.126 
(1.132) 
tpi  0.162 (1.622) 
 
 
 
 
 0.109 
(1.249) 
 
 
 
 
1−tpi  0.002 (0.031) 
 
 
 
 
 0.019 
(0.237) 
 
 
 
 
2−tpi  -0.019 (-0.360) 
 
 
 
 
 -0.015 
(-0.287) 
 
 
 
 
3−tpi  -0.022 (-0.348) 
 
 
 
 
 -0.042 
(-0.572) 
 
 
 
 
tρ   
 
0.081* 
(1.891) 
 
 
  
 
0.084 
(1.622) 
 
 
1−tρ   
 
0.010 
(0.281) 
 
 
  
 
0.008 
(0.157) 
 
 
2−tρ   
 
0.012 
(0.526) 
 
 
  
 
0.028 
(0.814) 
 
 
3−tρ   
 
-0.025 
(-1.080) 
 
 
  
 
-0.045 
(-1.444) 
 
 
ti   
 
 
 
0.099 
(1.414) 
  
 
 
 
0.027 
(0.458) 
1−ti   
 
 
 
0.108*** 
(3.145) 
  
 
 
 
0.131*** 
(4.048) 
2−ti   
 
 
 
-0.059 
(-1.624) 
  
 
 
 
-0.034 
(-0.965) 
3−ti   
 
 
 
-0.039 
(-1.373) 
  
 
 
 
-0.055*** 
(-2.171) 
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Table 2-7: Nominal Interest Rate-Maturity Relationships: Monthly Data 
(continued) 
 Jan 1995-Oct 2000  Jun 2001-Dec 2004 
 
tR  tR  tR   tR  tR  tR  
Constant 0.006 
(0.725) 
0.015*** 
(2.641) 
-0.0009 
(-0.101) 
 -0.017*** 
(-2.086) 
-0.006 
(-0.949) 
0.010 
(1.604) 
tM  -0.0102* (-1.779) 
-0.007** 
(-1.852) 
-0.0026 
(-0.738) 
 0.016*** 
(2.215) 
-0.006 
(1.023) 
-0.009 
(-1.629) 
D9912 -0.055*** 
(-3.689) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.330) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.714) 
    
D0012        
1−tR  0.695*** (2.702) 
0.543*** 
(3.285) 
0.576*** 
(3.889) 
 0.869*** 
(5.869) 
0.866*** 
(5.854) 
0.698*** 
(3.855) 
2−tR  -0.065 (-0.182) 
0.046 
(0.234) 
0.086 
(0.538) 
 0.121 
(0.537) 
0.094 
(0.361) 
-0.278 
(-1.152) 
3−tR  -0.037 (-0.148) 
0.179 
(1.276) 
0.010 
(0.083) 
 0.010 
(0.081) 
0.045 
(0.288) 
0.159 
(0.782) 
tpi  
1.697*** 
(2.802) 
   0.439*** 
(3.011) 
 
 
 
 
1−tpi  -0.758*** (-2.190) 
   -0.149* 
(-1.733) 
 
 
 
 
2−tpi  -0.307* (-1.659) 
   -0.091 
(-1.383) 
 
 
 
 
3−tpi  0.208 (1.294) 
   0.048 
(1.220) 
 
 
 
 
tρ   0.664*** (2.266) 
   
 
0.042* 
(1.690) 
 
 
1−tρ   -0.099 (-0.584) 
   
 
0.019 
(1.161) 
 
 
2−tρ   -0.185 (-1.445) 
   
 
-0.017 
(-1.109) 
 
 
3−tρ   -0.165 (-1.493) 
   
 
0.013 
(-1.396) 
 
 
ti    0.842*** (2.475) 
  
 
 
 
0.751 
(1.463) 
1−ti    -0.010 (-0.048) 
  
 
 
 
-0.264 
(-0.314) 
2−ti    -0.178 (-0.814) 
  
 
 
 
0.107 
(0.225) 
3−ti    -0.155 (-0.885) 
  
 
 
 
-0.193 
(-0.450) 
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Table 2-8: Chow Breakpoint Tests 
 Deflating Variable 
Breakpoints Tested tpi  tρ  ti  
Table 2-3 Specification 
1994:04 and 2001:02 in the 
whole sample 
22.88*** 
(0.000) 
20.59*** 
(0.000) 
11.90*** 
(0.000) 
1994:04 in the pre-2000 
October sub-sample 
42.18*** 
(0.000) 
40.91*** 
(0.000) 
25.50*** 
(0.000) 
2001:02 in the post-1995 
January sub-sample 
3.85** 
(0.022) 
2.22 
(0.109) 
14.46*** 
(0.000) 
Table 2-4 Specification 
1994:04 and 2001:02 in the 
whole sample 
5.66*** 
(0.000) 
8.39*** 
(0.000) 
3.52*** 
(0.008) 
1994:04 in the pre-2000 
October sub-sample 
-0.56 
(1.000) 
-5.90 
(1.000) 
11.76*** 
(0.000) 
2001:02 in the post-1995 
January sub-sample 
11.85*** 
(0.000) 
6.34*** 
(0.002) 
5.89*** 
(0.004) 
Table 2-5 Specification 
1994:04 and 2001:02 in the 
whole sample 
4.90*** 
(0.000) 
6.20*** 
(0.000) 
9.04*** 
(0.000) 
1994:04 in the pre-2000 
October sub-sample 
4.46*** 
(0.005) 
5.62*** 
(0.001) 
10.31*** 
(0.000) 
2001:02 in the post-1995 
January sub-sample 
9.99*** 
(0.000) 
28.68*** 
(0.000) 
17.08*** 
(0.000) 
Table 2-6 Specification 
1994:04 and 2001:02 in the 
whole sample 
1.86* 
(0.053) 
2.24** 
(0.017) 
4.55*** 
(0.000) 
1994:04 in the pre-2000 
October sub-sample 
-0.87 
(1.000) 
-2.93 
(1.000) 
7.61*** 
(0.000) 
2001:02 in the post-1995 
January sub-sample 
2.94** 
(0.015) 
2.85** 
(0.018) 
1.84 
(0.109) 
Table 2-7 Specification 
1994:04 and 2001:02 in the 
whole sample 
3.15*** 
(0.000) 
2.94*** 
(0.000) 
1.35 
(0.159) 
1994:04 in the pre-2000 
October sub-sample 
2.25** 
(0.022) 
1.09 
(0.367) 
1.23 
(0.276) 
2001:02 in the post-1995 
January sub-sample 
1.44 
(0.180) 
1.22 
(0.288) 
1.27 
(0.260) 
Note: F-statistics and the p-values (in parentheses) of the Chow tests are provided in the table. (*), (**) and (***) correspond to 
rejection of the null-hypothesis at the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. For each specification, three tests 
are computed. In the first test, the null hypothesis that no structural break exists is jointly tested for April-1994 and February-
2001 over the whole sample estimates. In the second test, the April-1994 structural break is tested over the pre-2000 October 
sub-sample. The third test considers the February-2001 break over the post-1995 January period. 
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Figure 2-1: Evolution of the Series (Auction Data) 
a. Auction Interest Rate, Nominal ( auctionR )* b. Auction Maturity ( auctionM ) 
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c. piAuctionr  Auction Interest Rate Deflated by the 
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* In all panels, the horizontal axis shows the observation numbers. Maturity is measured in 360-day years and other variables 
are displayed in decimals. 
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Figure 2-2: Evolution of the Series (Monthly Data) 
a. Nominal Weighted Average Auction Interest 
Rate ( tR )* 
b. Average Auction Maturity ( tM ) 
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* In all panels, the horizontal axis shows time periods (months). Maturity is measured in 360-day years and other variables are 
displayed in decimals. 
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Figure 2-3: Evolution of the First Differences of the Series (Auction Data) 
a. Auction Interest Rate, Nominal ( auctionR )* b. Auction Maturity ( auctionM ) 
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* In all panels, the horizontal axis shows the observation numbers. Maturity is measured in 360-day years and other variables 
are displayed in decimals. 
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Figure 2-4: Evolution of the First Differences of the Series (Monthly Data) 
a. Nominal Weighted Average Auction Interest 
Rate ( tR )* 
b. Average Auction Maturity ( tM ) 
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* In all panels, the horizontal axis shows time periods (months). Maturity is measured in 360-day years and other variables are 
displayed in decimals. 
  
 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 EFFECTS OF USD-EURO PARITY ON A SMALL OPEN 
ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
USD-Euro parity is one of the most widely followed variables in financial 
markets. Its sizable movements (see Figure 3-1) have often been elaborated on as 
regards their implications on developed economies. In this essay, I will assess the 
implications of USD-Euro parity (the US dollar value of the Euro) on a small open 
economy (SOE) under unbalanced trade denomination, where the exports are 
realized mainly in one currency and imports in another. 
In this essay, based on an illustrative model of the transmission of external 
parity movements to SOE dynamics, the effects of USD-Euro parity are analyzed 
using Turkish data. Note that Turkey is an SOE, and the relative movements of these 
major currencies are plausible to affect its major macroeconomic variables. These 
effects may occur through the channels of the real exchange rate and/or the terms of 
trade.  In fact, neither overlaps the other in a one-to-one fashion nor are they isolated 
from each other.  In either of these channels, net exports will respond to USD-Euro 
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parity as a result of the change in the relative prices of tradables.  The theoretical 
transmission mechanism that I propose is demonstrated with an illustrative model in 
Appendix 2, where USD-Euro parity enters the system by affecting net exports and 
domestic absorption. 
The relevance of the relationship between USD-Euro parity and the real 
exchange rate is two-fold in the case of Turkey.  Firstly, Turkey is a small open 
economy and cannot affect USD-Euro parity, but the reverse is true.  Therefore, my 
investigation focuses only on the effects of exogenous USD-Euro parity shocks on 
domestic macroeconomic performance, rather than looking in the opposite direction.  
Secondly, the currency composition of Turkey’s trade is not balanced.  For instance, 
for the year 2004, 50.1% of Turkish exports were denominated in Euros and 42.9% 
were denominated in USD. However, the composition of imports is such that the 
Euro and the USD have respective shares of 40.3% and 55.0%. Moreover, Turkey is 
a net exporter of tourism services and receives revenue from tourism, mostly 
originating from Europe. This further enhances the effects of USD-Euro parity on the 
domestic economy.  Hence, a change in USD-Euro parity is expected to have sizable 
effects on Turkish economic performance. 
In the literature, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study specifically 
considering the effects of USD-Euro parity on economic performance for a small 
open economy, except for Berument and Dincer (2005).  They look at the effects of 
USD-Euro parity on the Turkish trade balance and argue that an increase in the USD 
value of the Euro appreciates local currency and increase net exports. 
Spatafora (2003) looked at a similar issue by investigating the effects of G-
324 exchange rate volatility (not the level of the exchange rate as I do, but its 
                                                
24
 G-3 describes the three major currency areas, namely the United States, Japan and the Euro areas. 
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volatility) on developing economies.25 He noted that even after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system one-half to two-thirds of all developing countries actually 
continued pegging their exchange rates to the currencies of industrial countries. 
Therefore, the volatility of the major industrial countries’ currencies affects the 
volatility of the developing countries’ exchange rates. Then he argued that exports 
are affected positively (not statistically significant) and imports are affected 
negatively (significant) for the case of emerging markets. Nevertheless, Spatafora 
(2003) employed a broad panel of countries in his analysis and did not focus on any 
specific country. 
In the current study, in order to account for the exogeneity of USD-Euro 
parity, I assess the relationship within the VAR framework with block exogeneity.  
In particular, I allow USD-Euro parity to affect economic performance, but not vice 
versa. In order to capture the dynamics of the domestic economy – similar to Kamin 
and Rogers (2000) and Berument and Pasaogullari (2003) – I employ 3 variable 
VAR that include the real exchange rate, the inflation rate and the real GDP.  The 
response of the real exchange rate to USD-Euro parity indirectly reveals whether 
there is really an ultimate improvement in trade competitiveness and thus income.  
The empirical evidence provided in this essay suggests that an increase in the USD 
value of the Euro appreciates the real exchange rate, decreases inflation and increases 
output. 
The analysis and findings of this essay are important:  The case of Turkey 
with regard to changes in USD-Euro parity establishes a benchmark example for 
similar emerging market economies by demonstrating the extent of the exposure of a 
small-open economy to the relative movements of two big currencies.  The essay is 
                                                
25
 The impact that large currencies’ exchange rate movements have on advanced economies has been 
investigated and generally found to be small (World Economic Outlook, April 2002, Appendix 1.2; 
World Economic Outlook, May 2001, Appendix II). 
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structured as follows:  Section 2 presents the data and the results of my bivariate 
analysis.  In Section 3, my VAR specification is given.  I present and interpret the 
estimated impulse-responses in Section 4.  Finally, Section 5 concludes the essay. 
3.2. Data and Bivariate Analysis 
 
In this section, I first describe the data sources and give the definitions of my 
variables.  Then, I provide the cross-correlations, unit-root and cointegration tests for 
these variables.  The data were obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey26 with the exception of the GDP deflator, which was taken from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.27  My data set 
covers the period from the first quarter of 1987 to the last quarter of 2004.  In my 
analysis, Parity  is the natural logarithm of the USD value of the Euro.  The real 
exchange rate ( rexch ) is computed as the natural logarithm of the wholesale price 
index (1994=100) deflated Turkish lira value of the USD.28,29  The measure of the 
output ( y ) is the natural logarithm of the real GDP.  Inflation ( Inf ) is calculated as 
the quarterly percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
 In Table 3-1, the cross-correlations of Parity  with y , rexch , and Inf  are 
reported from 0 to 8 quarter lags, variables being used in the form of levels and first 
differences, as well as deviations from linear, quadratic, cubic and HP trends.  Table 
                                                
26
 Accessible at http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html 
27
 Accessible at http://ifs.apdi.net/imf 
28
 For USD-Euro parity and the TL/USD exchange rate raw data, I have used the period average 
values.  For the time period before the circulation of the Euro, USD-Euro parity is computed using the 
Euro to DEM (Deutsche Mark) conversion factor of 1.95 and the DEM/USD period average exchange 
rate.  I did not use the US CPI while computing the real exchange rate since Turkish inflation is 
remarkably high compared to that of the US.  For instance, the average annual consumer price 
inflation in Turkey and the United States for the 1987-2003 period are nearly 69% and 3%, 
respectively. 
29
 I have computed the real exchange rate based on the Turkish lira value of US dollar (instead of the 
Euro) following the usual convention in the empirical literature; see for instance Kamin and Rogers 
(2000) or Berument and Pasaogullari (2003). 
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3-1 suggests that, as far as the variables are considered in their levels, the cross-
correlation between Inf  and Parity  is significantly30 negative contemporaneously as 
well as when Parity  lags inflation by four quarters.  The cross-correlation between 
rexch  and Parity  is negative and significant at the lags of 3, 2, 1, and 0.  For y  and 
Parity , the cross-correlations are significant and positive for 2, 1 and 0 lags.  When I 
look at the cross-correlations between the first-differenced series, it can be seen that 
there is a negative association between Inf  and Parity  contemporaneously; that is, 
the amount of increase in inflation is negatively correlated with the rate of 
appreciation of the Euro against the USD.  At the lag of 4, the relationship is 
negative and significant, whereas at one lag of parity the relationship is positive.  The 
relationship between rexch  and Parity  is significantly positive only 
contemporaneously.  In other words, the rate of real appreciation of the Turkish lira 
and the rate of appreciation of the Euro against the USD are positively associated at 
zero lags.  The correlation between y  (i.e. the growth rate of real income after the 
first differencing) and Parity  (the rate of appreciation of the Euro against the USD) 
is negative and statistically significant when y  leads Parity  by 3 and 7 lags. I have 
also assessed the cross correlations between the deviations of my variables from their 
respective linear trends estimated via ordinary least squares.  These figures suggest 
that Inf  and Parity  are significantly negatively correlated at the lag of 4 and 
contemporaneously.  The variables rexch  and Parity  are correlated at the lags of 3 
and 4 negatively.  There is no statistically significant association between the 
deviations from the linear trend of y  and Parity .  Repeating the same exercise using 
the deviations of my series from their quadratic, cubic and HP-filtered trends, I 
                                                
30
 The level of statistical significance is 5%, unless otherwise noted. 
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observe no statistically significant cross-correlations among my variables of concern, 
except that there is a significant and positive association between rexch  and Parity  
when the former leads the latter by 8 lags. All in all, Table 3-1 provides statistical 
evidence; upon which I can argue that movements of Parity  lead to changes in the 
domestic economy, before I go into a more sophisticated modeling of the variables of 
interest.  
 The unit-root tests of Inf , Parity , rexch  and y  are reported in Table 3-2.  I 
have performed Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for each variable in two different 
setups.  In the first one, I include the constant term but exclude the trend term, 
whereas both are included in the second one. The null hypothesis is such that the 
variable of concern includes a unit-root.  In Table 3-2, the ADF test statistics for the 
first differences of my variables are also reported.  For each test presented in this 
table, the optimal lag length of the ADF Equation is obtained by minimizing the 
modified-Schwarz criterion.  Based on the ADF test statistics, I fail to reject the 
hypothesis of a unit-root for all of Parity , rexch , Inf , and y  in levels.  This 
observation is robust up to the inclusion of the trend in the ADF tests.  Consequently, 
I can conclude that all my series include unit-roots.  It can be seen that the unit-roots 
disappear when the test is conducted for the first differenced data series.  Thus, I can 
conclude that all my data series are )1(I  in their levels; that is, each series is 
integrated of order one. 
Table 3-3 presents Johansen’s cointegration test results for my variables of 
concern.  The cointegration test is performed for the endogenous Inf , rexch  and y , 
using Parity  as an exogenous variable.  Based on the traceλ  statistic, I reject the null 
hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegrating vectors is zero against the 
alternative that a larger number of cointegrating vectors exist at the 5% level of 
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significance.  In support of this, I reject, at the 5% level of significance, the null 
hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors against the alternative of one cointegrating 
vector using the maxλ  test statistics.  Therefore, using both tests, I fail to reject the 
null hypotheses that one cointegrating vector exists against respective alternatives, 
whereas I could reject the existence of two cointegrating vectors.  Consequently, I 
conclude that one cointegrating vector exists for my endogenous variables.  
Eventually, I perform my VAR analysis in logarithmic levels, following Sims, Stock 
and Watson (1990). 
Based on the findings of Table 3-3, it can be said that there is a long-run 
relationship among my variables of concern.  Furthermore, the cross-correlation 
results that are presented in Table 3-1 show some associations between Parity  and 
the other variables.  However, these patterns are not robust for different filters 
applied to my series.  More importantly, these observations neither rule out the 
possibility of a spurious relationship among my variables nor do they account for the 
transmission mechanism through which Parity  affects the other variables.  
Therefore, I specify and estimate a VAR model, which has the major advantage of 
capturing and measuring the effects of external parity shocks properly while 
accounting for the dynamic relationships among the variables of concern. 
3.3. Specification of the VAR System 
 
My bivariate analysis results do not provide us with a satisfying 
comprehension of the relationships among my variables.  Although I have failed to 
reject the existence of a long-run association among them, I have not obtained a clear 
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econometric description of such an association.  Therefore, I employ a VAR setup to 
account for the interaction among the variables under consideration. 
I basically use the impulse-response functions to describe the relationships 
that I am seeking within a VAR setup.  However, the standard form of VAR as used 
by Sims (1972) has a serious drawback in that the external variables are affected by 
the domestic variables with lags.  That is, I aim to measure the effects of external 
shocks on a small open economy, so the impact of a foreign shock on the domestic 
economy is important but not vice versa.  An identified VAR model with block 
exogeneity would overcome the above-mentioned problem as well as having the 
advantage of specifying economically meaningful simultaneous interactions among 
variables, instead of a complete set of Equations lacking economic intuition.  The 
restrictions on the lagged relationships are determined by the data. 
The general specification of Cushman and Zha (1997) and Zha (1999) can be 
used to assess the details of the identified VAR model with block exogeneity: 
(Eq. 3-1)   )()()( ttzLA ε=  
In (Eq. 3-1), )(tz  is an 1×m  vector of observations, )(LA  is an mm × matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator L  and )(tε  is an 1×m  vector of structural 
disturbances.  The specification in matrix form is as follows:  
(Eq. 3-2)   .)(
)()(,)()(
0)()(,)(
)()(
2
1
2221
11
2
1






=





=





=
t
t
t
LALA
LA
LA
tz
tz
tz
ε
ε
ε
 
The assumptions of (Eq. 3-2) are that the coefficient matrix of 0L  in )(LA , 0A  is 
non-singular and )(tε  is uncorrelated with )( stz −  for 0>s . 
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 In the matrix )(LA , )(12 LA  is zero so as to represent the block exogeneity.  
This means that the second block )(1 tz  is exogenous to the first block )(2 tz  both 
contemporaneously and for lagged values of the variables.  Thus, the maximum 
likelihood estimation of VAR models as in Sims (1986) and Gordon and Leeper 
(1994) is not applicable to the identified VAR model with block exogeneity.  The 
Maximum Likelihood estimation and inference for the second block are computed 
with the conventional Choleski normalization with the modified error bands of Sims 
and Zha (1999). 
 The lag order, suggested by the Schwarz Information Criterion, of my 
identified VAR model with block exogeneity is 2, and it is constructed as 
][1 Parityz =  and ],,[2 ′= yInfrexchz .  Therefore, the foreign shock that I are trying to 
analyze is in the USD-Euro parity.  Within this framework, USD-Euro parity does 
not get any feedback from the domestic economy.  The reverse is, by definition, valid 
in that the USD-Euro parity affects the domestic economy.  The ordering of the 
variables in 2z  is important.  My assumption is that the first variable that would be 
affected from an innovation in the parity is the real exchange rate.  The second 
variable in the ordering is inflation, which I assume will not affect the real exchange 
rate but is affected by the real exchange rate contemporaneously.  The last variable in 
the ordering is output because it is affected by both the real exchange rate and 
inflation contemporaneously, but not vice versa.  However, these three variables 
affect each other with lags.  In my specification, I also employ a constant term, and 
quarterly dummy variables to account for seasonality. 
My VAR specification, except for the inclusion of parity, is the same as those 
of Kamin and Rogers (2000), and Berument and Pasaogullari (2003), which 
respectively studied the cases of Mexico and Turkey.  The above-mentioned ordering 
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of endogenous variables in the VAR follows the same reasoning as proposed in those 
studies. 
3.4. Impulse Response Functions: Capturing the Effects of USD-Euro Parity 
 
The impulse response functions for 8 periods computed by using my VAR 
specifications are reported in Figure 3-2. A one standard deviation shock is given to 
parity within the SVAR specification described in Section 3.31 
In Figure 3-2, the self-response of parity is positive and statistically 
significant for seven periods.  The real exchange rate, rexch , responds negatively to 
an innovation in Parity  for seven quarters, i.e. a real appreciation of the TL against 
the USD.  Although the illustrative model of Appendix 2 shows the ambiguity of the 
sign of Parity  in the reduced-form real exchange rate Equation, this finding does not 
depict the same ambiguity.  The response of Inf  to Parity  is significantly negative 
for seven quarters.  In other words, when the USD value of the Euro increases, 
domestic inflation falls, which is consistent with recent developments in the Turkish 
economy.32  The real GDP ( y ) responds positively to Parity .  Its response is 
statistically significant for six quarters.  The responses of rexch  and y  to Parity  are 
economically meaningful according to my illustrative model given in Appendix 2.  
Although there is no clear implication about Inf  in the same model, the response of 
Inf  to Parity  has been clearly revealed by my Structural Vector Auto Regressions 
(SVAR) specification.  All these findings are acceptable by intuition, since an 
                                                
31
 I use the conventional “RATS” Bayesian simulation method based on Sims and Zha (1999) to 
produce the error bands for the impulse responses, where the error bands are 68% bands from the 
Bayesian procedure. 
32
 Starting at the end of 2001, the rate of inflation in Turkey displayed a noticeable decline, the key 
target of the latest stabilization package, which was also supported by the IMF. The parity 
developments in international foreign exchange markets have also been believed to partly support this 
disinflation process. 
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increase in the USD value of the Euro may cause an increase in the terms of trade, 
measured as the ratio of the price of exportables to the price of importables.  Such an 
increase improves the trade balance in the short-to-medium term, assuming that the 
real quantities of exports and imports will not be affected during this same period.33  
It is clear that such improvement in the trade balance will also improve output.  As 
far as domestic inflation is concerned, an increase in the USD value of the Euro is 
associated with the relative cheapening of imported inputs priced in USD terms.  In 
this way, domestic inflation drops significantly. 
In order to check for the robustness of my SVAR specification to crises, I 
replicate the results of Figure 3-2 after controlling for the occurrence of the two 
major financial crises in Turkey during the last decade, using the three additive 
dummy variables. The first crisis occurred in the second quarter of 1994 whereas the 
second and third dummies cover the last quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001. 
The major findings of Figure 3-2 do not change, as a visual comparison of Figure 3-3 
and Figure 3-2 reveals.  The negative response of inflation ( Inf ) is statistically 
significant for seven quarters (with the exception of the third quarter) and the 
positive response of the real GDP ( y ) is statistically significant for five quarters.  
The negative response of rexch  to Parity  runs from the second to the seventh period 
following the Parity  innovation. Therefore, I can say that the impulse-responses are 
robust even with the inclusion of crisis dummy variables.34 
 
                                                
33
 See Berument and Dincer (2005) on the effects of USD-Euro parity on the trade balance. 
34
 The sensitivity exercise that I have carried out using binary dummy variables is more mechanical in 
its nature; i.e. I want to control for any possible breaks in the estimated VAR relationship, without 
specific reference to the literature.
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
This essay examines how changes in USD-Euro parity affect the economic 
performance of a small open economy with different currency compositions of 
exports and imports, using Turkish data.  This research question is especially 
relevant since the relative movements of two of the world’s major currencies may 
have unidirectional and sizable effects on a small open economy, such as Turkey.  
These effects will be through the channels of real exchange rate and/or the terms of 
trade, where these two neither totally overlap, nor are they mutually exclusive.  
Regardless of the channel, net exports and output will eventually respond to changes 
in relative trade prices.  An unbalanced currency composition of trade can be viewed 
as a pre-condition for this last statement.  Since USD-Euro parity is an important 
exogenous variable for the case of Turkey, its effects are elaborated on in this study, 
where the empirical evidence suggests that inflation drops and output increases 
following positive parity innovations, the real exchange rate being negatively 
affected by USD-Euro parity. 
 The econometrics of the feedback from USD-Euro parity to the Turkish 
economy is carried out within a VAR system with block exogeneity.  This approach 
particularly suits the case at hand, owing to the one-way nature of the feedback.  That 
is, USD-Euro parity will have reflections on a small open economy while the 
occurrence of the opposite causality is never expected. My results are robust up to 
the inclusion of crisis dummies and the terms of trade in the VAR setup. 
The impact of the results of this essay is considerable since the case of 
Turkey, as a small open economy, establishes a benchmark example for similar 
economies with regard to changes in USD-Euro parity.  The extent of the exposure of 
a small open economy to the relative movements of two major currencies is clearly 
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depicted.  The fundamental conclusion of this study, hence, is that macroeconomic 
policies should be dependent on external parity shocks originating from the world’s 
major currencies. 
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Table 3-1: Cross-correlations of Parity and Other Variables of Concern 
 Levels a First differences 
Deviations from 
linear trend 
Lagb Inf  rexch
 
y  Inf  rexch  y  Inf  rexch  y  
0 -0.357* -0.280* 0.324* -0.323* 0.197* -0.046 -0.300* -0.166 -0.040 
1 -0.220* -0.248* 0.332* 0.203* 0.101 0.172 -0.136 -0.162 0.069 
2 -0.209* -0.247* 0.271* 0.020 -0.083 0.115 -0.105 -0.191 0.043 
3 -0.215* -0.235* 0.156 0.104 -0.093 -0.270* -0.133 -0.212* -0.102 
4 -0.288* -0.192 0.154 -0.262* -0.141 0.027 -0.252* -0.194* -0.041 
5 -0.193 -0.133 0.150 0.081 0.046 0.176 -0.151 -0.148 0.034 
6 -0.145 -0.096 0.076 0.055 -0.071 0.060 -0.083 -0.128 -0.024 
7 -0.136 -0.045 -0.032 0.030 -0.187 -0.232* -0.086 -0.099 -0.163 
8 -0.146 0.028 -0.029 -0.183 0.178 -0.007 -0.118 -0.042 -0.113 
    
 
Deviations from 
Quadratic trend 
Deviations from 
Cubic trend 
Deviations from 
HP trend 
Lagb Inf  rexch  y  Inf  rexch  y  Inf  rexch  y  
0 -0.121 -0.131 0.036 -0.121 -0.116 0.031 -0.125 -0.072 0.002 
1 0.079 -0.096 0.142 0.081 -0.099 0.144 0.103 -0.058 0.138 
2 0.044 -0.114 0.079 0.050 -0.143 0.083 0.075 -0.124 0.082 
3 0.005 -0.103 -0.084 0.009 -0.151 -0.084 0.029 -0.152 -0.102 
4 -0.156 -0.045 0.019 -0.156 -0.124 0.020 -0.157 -0.130 0.021 
5 -0.018 0.043 0.084 -0.020 -0.040 0.091 -0.006 -0.042 0.113 
6 0.020 0.098 -0.025 0.022 0.011 -0.016 0.044 0.003 0.006 
7 0.004 0.187 -0.180 0.004 0.092 -0.174 0.025 0.087 -0.166 
8 -0.032 0.324* -0.107 -0.035 0.263* -0.101 -0.021 0.271* -0.079 
a. The table shows the cross-correlations between Parity  and Inf , rexch , and y .  The 
transformation above each three-column block is applied to all variables included in that 
block. 
b. Lag refers to the number of periods by which USD-Euro parity lags a series. 
* Indicates that the cross-correlation figure is significant at the 10% level of significance.  
Standard deviations of cross-correlations are computed as T/1 , where T  is the sample size. 
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Table 3-2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
 ADF test in levels* ADF test in first differences 
 With constant 
Without trend 
With constant 
With trend 
 With constant 
Without trend 
Inf  -2.382 -2.955 Inf  -2.382 
Parity  
-0.795 -1.723 Parity  -0.795 
rexch  -1.376 -1.548 rexch  -1.376 
y  
-0.309 -1.504 y  -0.309 
* Rejection of the null-hypothesis of a unit-root at the 1% level of significance.  The optimal 
number of lags of the first difference of the test variable in the ADF test Equation is 
determined by using the modified-Schwarz criterion. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Table 3-3: Cointegration Test Among the Variables Inf, Rexch and y with the 
Exogenous Series Parity 
Hypothesized 
Number of 
Cointegrating 
Equations 
Eigenvalue maxλ  
5 percent 
Critical 
Value 
traceλ  
5 percent 
Critical 
Value 
None* 0.467 42.83 20.97 49.28 29.68 
At most 1 0.059 4.18 14.07 6.45 15.41 
At most 2 0.032 2.27 3.76 2.27 3.76 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  The critical values are 
based on Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
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Figure 3-1: USD-Euro Parity  
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USD-Euro parity is measured as the USD value of the Euro.  An increase in the parity figures, 
hence, shows the appreciation of the Euro against the USD. 
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Figure 3-2: Impulse-Response Functions 
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The central line in each panel presents the impulse-response function. The envelopes are the 68% error 
bands obtained from the Bayesian procedure, based on Sims and Zha (1999). 
* * * 
Figure 3-3: Impulse-Response Functions: With crisis dummies 
Response of Parity to Parity Response of Real Exchange Rate to 
Parity 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.050
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
 
Response of Inflation to Parity Response of Real GDP to Parity 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-5.0
-2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
 
The central line in each panel presents the impulse-response function. The envelopes are the 68% error 
bands obtained from the Bayesian procedure, based on Sims and Zha (1999). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 IS BUDGET DEFICIT AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF FISCAL 
STANCE? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Inflation is a monetary phenomenon, but Fischer and Easterly (1990) argue 
that fiscal expansion is the main motive of monetary expansion; thus, inflation 
should be a fiscal phenomenon.  All the attempts made by Turkey to decrease 
inflation or to stabilize the economy are also associated with the fiscal tightening.  In 
all these attempts, consolidated budget figures are used to measure the fiscal 
tightness.  However, measuring and monitoring fiscal tightness is problematic.  
Deficit from consolidated budget does not measure the stance of fiscal policy and its 
information content for the future economic performance is weak.  For example, 
Polackova (1998) argues that the government's hidden financial commitments and 
contingent liabilities become a major concern for macroeconomic and fiscal 
instability in a number of countries.  Similar argumentation can be found in Easterly 
(1999) where it is argued that government can respond to forces which impose 
contractionary changes in its conventional deficit by lowering its asset accumulation 
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or increasing its hidden liabilities.  Clearly, fiscal adjustment is illusionary under 
such circumstances.  To be particular, Metin (1998) finds a positive relationship 
between inflation and the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), Ozmen and 
Koru (2000) cannot find a similar relationship between inflation and the consolidated 
budget deficit for Turkey. Thus, consolidated budget deficit could be a misleading 
measure to stabilize the economy.  Moreover, Joulfaian and Marlow (1991), using 
U.S. data and employing a Granger causality framework, find sound evidence that 
the information content of the budget deficit statistics is not conclusive about the 
stance of the fiscal policy.  Their study is motivated with the hypothesis that controls 
on on-budget government spending leads to greater off-budget activity.  In this study, 
the analysis by Joulfaian and Marlow (1991) is extended by further investigating for 
the linkage between the consolidated budget deficit and the total public budget 
deficit under asymmetric situations in which the on-budget activity goes under 
expansionary or contractionary changes.  
 Turkey forms an appropriate example for the mentioned case of on-budget 
and off-budget relationship.  In Turkey, the public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR) consists of a number of items, which are not the consolidated central 
government; these are losses of state-owned enterprises, subsidies to the social 
security system, duty-losses of the publicly owned banks, contribution to revolving-
fund institutions, budgets of local governments, default payments on guaranteed 
investment, and project credits by the Treasury.  Among those, only the central 
government budget is subject to the control of the Ministry of Finance.  The 
consolidated budget constitutes around 60 to 80% of the PSBR and this ratio changes 
from year to year.  Therefore, a stable relationship between the figures of the 
consolidated budget and PSBR does not exist. 
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  My analysis reveals that the information content of the consolidated budget 
deficit statistics is not empty, as opposed to the case of Joulfaian and Marlow (1991).  
My major result is that the PSBR increases in response to a positive innovation to the 
consolidated budget deficit, indicating the absence of the substitution effect proposed 
by Joulfaian and Marlow (1991).  In other words, even when the policy-makers 
induce an expansion of the consolidated budget, it is still possible for the off-budget 
items to increase. One another important point that needs to be highlighted is that a 
decrease in PSBR deficit is actually associated with an increase in budget deficit.  
This might be due to increased efforts in the past to limit off-consolidated budget 
deficit, so that total (PSBR) deficit decreases, but I put partly these decreased items 
to the consolidated budget.  This suggests that even if I adopt a tight fiscal policy 
consolidated budget deficit might be showing loose fiscal policy.  Thus, it is worth to 
mention that the information provided by the consolidated budget deficit might be 
misleading for judging about the stance of the fiscal policy in Turkey.  
The significance of my study is two-folds.  First, I provide evidence 
regarding the low reliability of the consolidated budget deficit statistics in evaluating 
the stance of fiscal policy in Turkey, hence finding a reason for the dispute between 
Metin (1998) and Ozmen and Koru (2000). Second, I extend the work of Joulfaian 
and Marlow (1991) by performing the analysis under asymmetric movements of the 
consolidated government budget, hence accounting for the functional relationship 
between on-budget and off-budget activities.  In Section 2, I describe my data and 
variables.  Section 3 presents the methodology and the empirical results.  Finally, 
Section 4 concludes the essay.  
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4.2. Data and Variables 
 
The data on the consolidated budget deficit, the public sector borrowing 
requirement, and gross domestic product are provided by the Undersecretariat of 
Treasury and the State Institute of Statistics35, all measured in current billion TL. 
Then, my variables BD and PSBR are defined as the ratios of the nominal 
consolidated budget deficit and nominal public sector borrowing requirement to 
nominal GDP, respectively.  A positive value of BD indicates a consolidated budget 
deficit, by definition, and vice versa.  The data set is annual from 1975, the official 
start of data series, to 2000.  Although data exist for 2001, I exclude this year in my 
data set since the huge transfers to public sector banks largely distorted the public 
sector borrowing requirement figure for 2001.  The time plots of my variables of 
interest are given in Figure 4-1 which suggests an association between my variables 
of interest on the surface. 
4.3. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.3.1. Symmetric Effects 
 
I analyze the linkage between the ratio of the consolidated budget deficit to 
GDP (BD) and the ratio of the total public budget deficit, measured by the public 
sector borrowing requirement, to GDP (PSBR), using Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) models.  I define my basic VAR model as follows: 
 
 
                                                
35
 All data series can be reached at the data delivery system of the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey, http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html 
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Using Specification 1, I seek for the baseline relationship between PSBR and BD. I 
obtain the impulse response functions from Specification 136, using a Monte Carlo 
procedure with 500 replications.  In my VAR specification, the ordering of the 
variables is such that the consolidated budget deficit is affected first and then the 
impact of any possible shock is transmitted to my second variable, namely the total 
government budget deficit contemporaneously.  This ordering is important in the 
sense that I introduce a shock to my variable over which more control can be 
exercised.  In other words, I first let the government take expansionary or 
contractionary actions over its consolidated budget; then I observe the incidence of 
such action on other items of the public budget.  Hence, I follow the basic hypothesis 
structure offered by Joulfaian and Marlow (1991).  The graphs of these impulse 
response functions can be seen in Figure 4-2.37  The figure suggests that the 
consolidated budget deficit gives a negative response to a one-standard-deviation 
innovation to the total public budget deficit, yet this relationship is not statistically 
significant.  On the other hand, as I introduce a one standard deviation positive 
innovation to the consolidated budget deficit, the total public budget deficit 
increases, and this is statistically significant at least for two years.  This result differs 
from that of Joulfaian and Marlow (1991) in the sense that no substitution exists 
between the on-budget and off-budget activities in my study. 
 
                                                
36
 The lag length of 1 is determined by using Schwarz Information Criterion. 
 
37
 The estimates of the impulse response coefficients are plotted with 90% confidence bounds unless 
otherwise specified. 
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4.3.2. A Contraction in the Consolidated Budget 
 
It is worth to mention that the relationship that is presented in the previous 
subsection provides only a basic understanding of the linkage between the budget 
deficit and the public sector borrowing requirement.  Moreover, the reader may 
notice that the process presented by Specification 1 does not account for any 
asymmetric effects; yet I extend my analysis in order to capture possible asymmetric 
effects of the size of the consolidated budget deficit on the public sector borrowing 
requirement.  It may be quite possible that a contraction of the consolidated budget 
affects the total public budget differently than an expansion of the consolidated 
budget does.  Under a contraction of on-budget activity I can expect an increase in 
off-budget activity due to the resource constraints faced by policy makers other than 
the central government.  On the other hand, such distortion of the constraint on 
financial resources will not be seen in the case of an expansion of the consolidated 
budget.  Following Specification 1, the consolidated budget is modeled as: 
(Eq. 4-1)   t
n
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Having obtained the residuals from (Eq. 4-1), I define my dummy variables which 
are designated as indicators of the situations in which the actual consolidated budget 
deficit figure is above and below the estimate of it obtained from (Eq. 4-1) to account 
for unanticipated fiscal easiness and tightness as measured with the consolidated 
budget.  I call these variables Pt and Nt, respectively; and define them in terms of 
residuals from (Eq. 4-1) as follows:  
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 In my next specification, I add Pt, and its interactions with BDt-i and PSBRt-i 
to my basic VAR model.  In this way, I intend to control for the observations at 
which the actual budget deficit figure is larger than the estimated one; hence, I distill 
the relationship under the case of the contraction of the consolidated budget.  I 
estimate the following VAR model: 
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My use of interaction terms in Specification 2 is due to Ellis and Thoma (1991).  
These terms are designated to handle the asymmetric effects when the consolidated 
budget deficit exceeds its value estimated by (Eq. 4-1).  I estimate the VAR model 
and obtain the impulse response functions using a Monte Carlo procedure with 500 
replications, which are presented in Figure 4-3.  
 Figure 4-3 suggests that a one-standard-deviation negative shock to the total 
public budget deficit, namely a movement of PSBR in surplus direction, increases 
the consolidated budget deficit.  However, the total public budget deficit decreases 
after a one-standard-deviation negative shock to the consolidated budget deficit.  
Both relationships are statistically significant.  In comparison with the results 
presented in Figure 4-2, it is observed that the response of the consolidated budget to 
total public budget becomes significant.  The response of the total public budget to 
the consolidated budget remains significant.  Furthermore, the directions of change 
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do not differ between Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3.38  The difference between the 
response coefficients in the two figures is sizable. 
4.3.3. An Expansion in the Consolidated Budget 
 
In the last stage of my analysis, in order to control for the observations at 
which the actual consolidated budget deficit figure is smaller than the figure 
estimated with (Eq. 4-1), I replace Pt with Nt in Specification 2.  Then, I can present 
my last model as described by the following VAR setup: 
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Having controlled for the observations at which the consolidated budget deficit falls 
short of its value estimated by (Eq. 4-1), I can figure out the relationship between the 
consolidated budget deficit and the total public budget deficit for the case of the 
expansion of the consolidated budget.  This is again through a Monte Carlo 
procedure with 500 replications upon the estimates of the model described by 
Specification 3.  The impulse responses for my last model are provided in Figure 4-4, 
which suggests that a one-standard-deviation positive shock to the total public budget 
deficit induces a decrease of the consolidated budget deficit; yet, this relationship is 
not statistically significant.  When I introduce a one-standard-deviation positive 
shock to the consolidated budget deficit, it is observed that the total public sector 
borrowing requirement increases in a statistically significant manner. 
                                                
38
 The impulse response coefficients are plotted with the reversed sign in Figure 4-3 for better 
visualization and understanding.  The reader can interpret the plotted response coefficients upon one-
standard-deviation negative shocks to the variables of concern. 
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 In general, a contraction of the consolidated budget is expected to induce an 
expansion of the off-budget activities, hence an expansion of the total public budget.  
However, an expansion of the consolidated budget is not expected to cause a 
contraction of the total public budget despite an expected fall in the off-budget 
expenses.  When I interpret my findings in comparison to these conjectures, I can say 
that the consolidated budget and the total public budget moves together whenever the 
innovation is introduced to the first one; and they move in opposite directions if the 
innovation is introduced to the total public budget, in all three cases that I have 
analyzed.  Then, it is clear that the information content of the budget deficit statistics 
of Turkey is not empty.  However, the conclusions driven by the budget deficit 
statistics might be misleading while assessing whether the fiscal policy in action is 
expansionary or contractionary. 
4.3.4. Further Remarks 
 
I have presented my basic findings in the previous subsections. In this 
subsection, I elaborate on the structure of budget statistics in Turkey, as well as the 
general attitudes of public decision-making entities toward budgetary operations.  
Turkish Constitution requires all state expenditures to have an official record in the 
budget owing to the parliamentary characteristic of the Republic of Turkey.  In other 
words, all decision-making bodies must be accountable for their responsibilities.  
However, Financial Report of the Turkish Court of Accounts (2000) introduces and 
employs a new term “off-record”39 budget to denote the operations, which, in fact, do 
                                                
39
 The reader will distinguish my use of the terms on-budget versus off-budget from the Court of 
Account's use of the terms on-record versus off-record budget.  While I distinguish between central 
government budget and the remaining part of public budget, the Court of Accounts puts the emphasis 
whether a given public expense has a record in the budget amended by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly or not. 
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not relate to the official budget although they actually must be.  These operations are 
actually related to several public expenses, but they are recorded in a way that hides 
them from the auditing function of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
 According to the Treasury Operations Report of the Turkish Court of 
Accounts (2001), off-record budget expenses have three major negative implications 
for the economy.  First, actual budget deficit is under-reported.  This hides crucial 
information regarding the central government activities.  Moreover, the importance 
and power of impact of the budget decreases. Second, while reporting the sources 
and uses of national budget, part of the newly created debt is hidden.  Finally, since 
off-record budget is not in reach of the audit power of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, effective monitoring of public expenses becomes nearly impossible and 
accountability of decision makers is not well-established. 
 To shed some light on the actual budgetary position and financing activities, 
the Turkish Court of Accounts employs a different measure in assessing the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement, which is called “Net Debt Revenue”.  Net Debt 
Revenue (NDR) is defined as the total amount of newly created debt minus all debt 
repayments by the Treasury in a given year.  In this way, the Court monitors the 
actual path of public debt creation process instead of taking into account the reported 
PSBR figures.  Given the definition of NDR, whenever there is a difference between 
NDR and PSBR, the quantity NDR-PSBR shows the off-record public expenses. NDR 
series has stronger local trends than the reported PSBR series has, i.e. it has higher 
variation yet a smaller number of turning points as depicted by Figure 4-1.  
 The definition of NDR as proposed by the Turkish Court of Accounts has a 
couple of drawbacks, as well.  For example, NDR is sensitive to the maturity 
structure of the public debt.  The reader may try to construct an imaginary series 
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assuming, ceteris paribus, that the maturity of the public debt increases over time.  In 
such a case, NDR will understate the actual picture.  Furthermore, as far as the data 
generating process underlying the NDR series is considered, it is apparent that NDR 
series is associated with two error terms, namely the ones belonging to the PSBR 
series and to series of the off-record expenses.  However, for sake of completeness, I 
regenerated my previous exercise using the NDR40 series instead of the PSBR, yet the 
estimates were far from being statistically significant though having the similar 
impulses as before.  The final experiment of ours, in which I used NDR-PSBR 
instead of PSBR did not result in statistically significant findings, either.  The lack of 
significance in these two exercises is probably due to the more complicated data 
generating processes, reminding us the Type II error, e.g. not rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is false. 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I elaborated on the question of whether the size of the budget 
deficit is an appropriate and adequate measure of the stance of fiscal policy in 
Turkey by analyzing the relationship between the consolidated budget deficit and the 
total public budget deficit due to Joulfaian and Marlow (1991).  Having observed the 
opposite findings by Metin (1998) and Ozmen and Koru (2000)41 regarding the 
relationship between inflation and budget deficit in Turkey, I raised the question of 
whether the consolidated budget deficit and the total public budget deficit behave 
similarly, yet the paper does not argue about who the winner of the dispute is. 
                                                
40
 Nominal Net Debt Revenue data was compiled from the Financial Report (2000) and the Treasury 
Operations Report (2000) of the Turkish Court of Accounts.  Then, NDR is computed as the ratio of 
nominal net debt revenue to the gross domestic product. 
41
 Ozmen and Koru (2000) do not find the positive association between inflation and budget deficit for 
Turkey that is revealed by Metin(1998).  Recall that the former performs analysis employing the 
consolidated budget deficit while the latter uses the public sector borrowing requirement. 
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In my analysis, using VAR specifications, the relationship between the 
consolidated budget deficit and the total public budget deficit in Turkey was figured 
out for the period of 1975-2000.  The analysis was performed for three cases; namely 
for the overall sample, controlling for the observations with a contraction in the 
consolidated budget and controlling for the observations with an expansion in the 
consolidated budget.  In the first case, total public budget deficit responds positively 
to a positive innovation to the consolidated budget.  In either of the second and third 
cases the directions of change of the total public budget and the consolidated budget 
are the same.  These three cases provide us with enough evidence to conclude that 
the consolidated budget deficit statistics have some informational value; yet the 
provided information may be misleading for assessing the fiscal stance of the 
government.  Therefore, there apparently exists a need to find a more appropriate and 
adequate measure. 
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Figure 4-1:Consolidated Budget Deficit, Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
and Net Debt Revenue: 1975-2001 
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This figure shows the time paths of the Consolidated Budget Deficit (BD), the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and the Net Debt Revenue (NDR) from 1975 to 2000.  The variables 
are defined as proportions of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  A rough association between the 
variables is what an initial look yields.  This may point out the missing substitution between the on-
budget and off-budget activities.  Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001) can be visited for the behaviours of my 
variables of interest in retrospect. 
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Figure 4-2:  Impulse Responses:  Symmetric Effects 
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The impulse responses are displayed in the four panels of the figure.  In each panel, the horizontal 
axis shows the time periods and the magnitudes of the response coefficients are given on the vertical 
axis.  The impulse responses are for positive one-standard-deviation innovations in the affecting 
variable.  “BD to PSBR” should read “response of BD to a one-standard-deviation positive innovation 
in PSBR”.  The dashed curves are the 90% confidence bounds. 
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Figure 4-3:  Impulse Responses:  Contraction in the Consolidated Budget 
-0.012
-0.010
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
1 2 3 4 5
BD to BD
 
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
1 2 3 4 5
BD to PSBR
 
-0.016
-0.012
-0.008
-0.004
0.000
0.004
1 2 3 4 5
PSBR to BD
 
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
1 2 3 4 5
PSBR to PSBR
 
 
The impulse responses are displayed in the four panels of the figure.  In each panel, the horizontal 
axis shows the time periods and the magnitudes of the response coefficients are given on the vertical 
axis.  The impulse responses are for negative one-standard-deviation innovations in the affecting 
variable.  “BD to PSBR” should read “response of BD to a one-standard-deviation negative 
innovation in PSBR”.  The dashed curves are the 90% confidence bounds. 
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Figure 4-4:  Impulse Responses:  Expansion in the Consolidated Budget 
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The impulse responses are displayed in the four panels of the figure.  In each panel, the horizontal 
axis shows the time periods and the magnitudes of the response coefficients are given on the vertical 
axis.  The impulse responses are for positive one-standard-deviation innovations in the affecting 
variable.  “BD to PSBR” should read “response of BD to a one-standard-deviation positive innovation 
in PSBR”.  The dashed curves are the 90% confidence bounds. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 LONG LIVE FENERBAHCE: PRODUCTION BOOSTING EFFECTS OF 
FOOTBALL 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The connection between Turkish industrial production performance and the 
success of a popular Turkish football team, namely Fenerbahce, is the central theme 
of this article. The success of Fenerbahce is interpreted as a proxy for the workers' 
mood/morale.  Performing a transfer function analysis on my data set, I reveal a 
positive feedback from Fenerbahce's success to economic performance such that the 
monthly industrial growth rate increases by 0.26% with the number of games won by 
Fenerbahce in European cups, regardless of where the game is played. On the other 
hand, the evidence of the effects of Fenerbahce’s domestic games on industrial 
performance is not statistically significant.  Based on my findings, it can be argued 
that there is a psychological/social link between the success of a top rank Turkish 
team and the performance of workers in industry. 
The main claim of this study is that when people’s favorite team is successful 
then they get in a better mood and become more productive.  Since I do not have a 
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direct measure of “mood”, I employ the success of a popular football team as an 
indicator of people’s “mood”.  I also provide an array of possible theoretical 
explanations for my hypothesis and propose a transmission mechanism that defines 
the process that links football success to workers’ productivity.  More specifically, 
Fenerbahce’s success is expected to affect the industrial production growth positively 
and in a statistically significant manner.  The validity of this hypothesis is tested 
under different setups to check for the robustness of my statistical assessment. 
At the very beginning, I should admit that my choice of Fenerbahce as the 
object of analysis does not represent any subjective preferences.  This choice is 
basically motivated by the general perception of the team by the Turkish society 
often uses the phrase “Fenerbahce Republic”.  That is, the team is a stylized 
example/symbol of a long-lived sports institution and supporters’ strong loyalty to 
it.42 
 The next section presents my proposed mechanism, which links productivity 
to football success in an attempt to guide readers through the article.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the relevant literature. Then, the structure of the Turkish 
football industry is described.  Finally, estimations and commentary on results are 
presented as separate sections, in that order. 
5.2. Proposed Relationship between Football Success and Productivity 
 
The mechanism is triggered by some temporary innovations to social 
cohesion among the supporters of a team.  Football success, in this regard, is an 
innovation that boosts the morale and self-esteem of the fans of a team.  This will 
                                                
42
 As a part of robustness tests, I repeated the analysis for the other two big teams in Turkey (Beikta 
and Galatasaray), the basic conclusions were robust. 
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elevate the individuals’ morale and self-esteem.  In this way, there will be a positive 
affect, then this higher self-esteem will lead to higher production due to better social 
behavior and more efficient decision making. In the next section, where I discuss the 
related lines of the literature, I also extend each component of my proposed 
mechanism. 
5.3. Literature and the Background Material 
 
This section briefly reviews different lines of earlier literature, which lend 
support to my proposed mechanism.  It should be stressed that these lines of 
literature are neither overlapping nor are they mutually exclusive in their respective 
scopes; and this is basically how they fit into the proposed mechanism. 
5.3.1. Economics of Sports  
 
The economics of sports have introduced an important volume of research.  
Much of these efforts are directed toward investigating the public financing of sports 
facilities.  This basically involves how much the building of new sports facilities or 
the spending of fans who come for sport events contribute to an economy (one may 
look at Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000, for an extensive review of the literature).  
Only two studies led us to think that productivity increases following the success of 
football is the channel to affect production even if none-of them state it quite like 
that.   To be specific, Coates and Humphreys (2002) investigate the determinants of 
real income in cities with professional sports teams and report evidence that the 
home city of the winner of the Super Bowl has higher real per capita income.  
Although it is only statistically mentioned (not explicitly elaborated on), another 
likely mechanism how championship affects real income in the home city of the 
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champion, might work to increase the productivity of labor.  Similarly, Pollard 
(2002) addresses the linkage between growth performance and the World Cup 
success of selected countries and demonstrates a positive relationship, without 
mentioning a possible reason for it. 
There are other studies examining the relationships between success in sports 
and economic performance.  Ashton, Gerrard and Hudson (2003) reveal a strong 
association between the performance of the England’s football team and subsequent 
daily changes in the FTSE 100 index. They mention a possible ‘feel good’ factor to 
explain why the stock market reacts to the performance of the national football team.  
Watson (2001) demonstrates that the Super Bowl has proved to be right 83% of the 
time in predicting an increase in the stock market.  Similarly, in Haugen and Hervik 
(2002), ups and downs of the London Stock Exchange map the disasters and 
triumphs of the English football team.  
None of these studies measure the exact mechanism through which sporting 
success affects production.  However, all of them highlight the observation that 
sporting success has certain effects on economic variables.  Consequently, one might 
attribute such effects to a psychological/social angle of productivity. 
5.3.2. Identity, Social Cohesion and Spectating Behavior 
 
Iso-Ahola and Hatfield (1985) draw the following main conclusions when 
they examine the spectator behavior:  First, growing in a sports culture makes it 
likely that individuals will become sports consumers who are drawn most powerfully 
towards contests between equal but successful teams.  Second, fans personalize 
victory and bask in reflected glory.  Finally, external attribution biases 
psychologically insulate spectators from the pain of defeat, and internal biases make 
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winning that much sweeter.  Based on these, I can attribute a great deal of 
importance to the role of sport events in re-establishing and maintaining the self-
esteem and morale of the spectators. 
 The term ‘social cohesion’ is often used to describe a positive characteristic 
of a society that deals with the relationships among members of that society.  It is 
synonymous with ‘social fabric’, implying a supporting structure for the groups 
within a society.  In other words, it is the bonding effect of that web of social 
relationships through which individuals are attached to and help each other in a 
society, knowingly or inadvertently, to achieve their full potential (Stanley, 1997, 
p.2).   
It should be stressed that spectating behavior and football performance should 
not be thought as major sources of identity and pride; but as complementary ones.  
For an average citizen, football-related material is almost always accessible and 
consumable.  More importantly, the consumption of football by a spectator mostly 
requires a gathering of people, although that gathering makes them an aggregate 
rather than a group.  Moreover, once I accept the function of football as a pride 
maintainer, I can say that this aggregate becomes more closely attached each time 
they are engaged in a football event.  In line with the above arguments, Kennedy 
(2001, p. 282) argues that in many cases in professional sports the community of 
spectators is a thoroughly commodified cohesion.  As he suggests, the state or 
commercial sponsors, and the broadcasting media, contribute to the lack of cohesion 
or lack of community that spectators otherwise feel in their everyday lives.   
Social identification can be defined as the perception of belonging to a group 
and a sense of openness with the group (see, Ashfort and Mael, 2001). Tolman 
(1943) argues that with identification, agents feel at one with the group.  The 
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successes/failures of a group become the agent’s successes/failures; the groups’ 
prestige/humiliation becomes the agent’s prestige/humiliation. Identification also 
enhances self-esteem, provides meaning and purpose in life and raises aspirations 
(see for example, Ibarra, 1999).  Being a fan of a football team is a specific form of 
social identification.  Fanship is an association in which a great deal of emotional 
significance is derived from membership.  Schafer (1969) argues that fans of a team 
value their team as an extension of their personal sense of self.  Therefore, they value 
their team’s success as their own success. Success in football provides a reference 
point in agents’ behavior to maximize their individual potential.   Seeing what others 
are capable of may provide motivation to strive and achieve (e.g., Ibarra, 1999).  
Heider’s (1958) balance formulation suggests that a fan of a team who evaluates a 
team positively will also evaluate the associated fan positively.  Therefore, this 
increases the agent’s self-esteem in the eyes of others. Sloan (1979) measured fans’ 
moods before and after a game.  He found that agents report greater happiness and 
lower anger or discouragement after a victory, and the opposite is true after a loss. 
Schwarz et al. (1987) reported that German men were more satisfied with their lives 
after a victory of the German national team in the 1982 Soccer World Championship 
but the opposite was true after a defeat. Hirt (1992) found that one’s favorite team’s 
winning/losing does affect the fan’s mood or self-esteem.  After a win, agents 
estimated their own abilities to perform various tasks to be higher than subjects 
whose team lost. Moreover, game outcome affects agents’ estimates of their own 
future performance. 
 Certain characteristics of football success can be an important dimension in 
the success-productivity relationship, especially when I reconsider the case in a 
domestic versus international perspective. Once I accept the aforementioned 
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relationship, I should accept it for all teams in a domestic league.  In this case, the 
success of a given team within a domestic league will improve the morale of its 
supporters while reducing that of the supporters of other teams, possibly implying a 
crowding out of morale innovations; and hence a crowding out of productivity 
outcomes.  On the other hand, when a team plays abroad against a foreign rival, it is 
quite likely that the domestic non-supporters of the team will support it on that 
occasion.  Therefore, winning against a foreign rival will increase the morale of 
society more than winning against a domestic rival.  
 Another reason why wins against foreign rivals stimulate the production is 
that national pride could be enhancing self-esteem and mood for a sports fan even 
more. States usually have at least one national football team to represent them in 
international competitions and their national football associations represent them in 
the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association), (Duke and Crolley, 
1996; p.4). Anderson (1983) treats nations as imagined communities combining both 
objective and subjective attributes. Tomlinson (1994) suggests that nations attain 
their fullest expression in either of two ways: war or sport.  Consequently, football 
captures the notion of an imagined community.  The national identity is confirmed, 
when eleven players are representing it in a match against that of another nation.  
Therefore, general motivation and pride of a nation can be enhanced through football 
matches. 
 The contribution of sports to nationalism can be marked as important even in 
the era of globalization.  Wong and Trumper (2002) examine the cases of two global 
celebrity athletes and conclude that they serve as national culture icons for the 
formation and reaffirmation of national identities in their countries of birth, despite 
their transnational nature.   
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5.3.3. Mood and Productivity 
 
Positive mood has been associated with various behaviors that may enhance 
performance; these are greater support behavior, enhanced creativity, more efficient 
decision making, greater cooperation, the use of more successful negotiation 
strategies and fewer absences (see, for example, Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998; Staw 
and Barsade, 1993 George, 1989).  George (1991) associates positive mood with 
sales-related prosocial behavior, but negative mood is associated with lower 
performance (Monk, 1990).   
Even if there is extensive literature on the relationship between mood and 
performance, this does not mean that the causation is from mood to performance. It 
might very well be the case that performance affects mood (see, Wright, Cropanzano 
and Meyer, 2004).  However, Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, and Vohs (2003) 
associate the mood with achieving more goals, more satisfaction with progress 
toward goals, more behavioral pursuit of goals. Their research suggests high self-
esteem people use better self-regulation strategies than low self-esteem people to 
achieve their respective tasks. 
On the other hand, Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner and Reynolds (1996) argue 
that mood affects a range of processes including perception, reasoning, memory and 
behavior, all of which may be involved with performance. Totterdell (1999) found 
that cricket players’ subjective and objective performances are related to their 
happiness, energy, enthusiasm, focus and confidence during the match.  In particular, 
players perform better when they are happy, focused, energetic, enthusiastic and 
confident.  As regards how mood affects performance, Matthews (1992) elaborated 
on two channels on this transmission (1) the facilitating effects of energetic mood on 
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information processing efficiency, (2) the facilitating effects of hedonic tone 
(pleasantness of mood) on the processing of mood-congruent information. 
The model of George and Brief (1996) proposes that moods (both positive 
and negative) are related to performance.  They argue that moods can influence both 
the distal (i.e. related to behavior choice or effort level) and the proximal (i.e. related 
to the actual task-specific behavior itself) aspects of motivation. For distal 
motivation, moods affect the various cognitive mechanisms associated with how one 
determines “appropriate” expectancy, instrumentality and valence levels.  
Moods, especially positive moods, may lead to proximal motivation (actual 
task-specific behaviors) through their ability to stimulate employee self-motivating 
behavior.  Alternatively, even if their potential effects are not as easily observed and 
are not direct. 
To sum up the discussion of this sub-section, this theory of psychology and 
the associated empirical research provide us with support as to how the 
positive/optimistic psychological state of individuals is correlated with job 
performance.  In the spirit of the discussion of this section, Fenerbahce’s success, 
owing to the wide popularity of the team, significantly adds to fans’ self-esteem and 
mood, consequently improving job performance and productivity due to a better 
decision making process and the enhancement of social cohesion, although it might 
be temporary.  
5.3.4. Summary 
 
On the whole, the literature that has been surveyed provides us with 
theoretical support as to the productivity enhancing effects of “football success”.  
Briefly, spectating behavior transforms the football success into an elevated level of 
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morale.  This initial boost augments social cohesion and individual’s self-perception.  
Then, through the self-esteem/mood channel, people tend to cooperate more, have 
more efficient decision making processes and demonstrate a higher level of 
productivity.    From a technical point of view, I am not equipped to measure any of 
these variables except football success and productivity.  My proposed mechanism 
introduces a plausible attempt to explain the connection between sporting success 
and productivity, which has not been addressed in detail in earlier literature on sports 
economics.   
5.4. Turkish Football Industry and Social Aspects of Football in Turkey 
 
The Turkish National Football League (NFL) was established in 1959.  The 
number of teams, varying between 12 and 20, was finally fixed at 18 after the 1994-
95 season.  Currently, all the teams play each other during the season and the 
winning team receives 3 points, ties get 1 point and the losing team gets no points.  
At the end of each season, the team having the highest overall score wins the 
championship. 
The teams to play in the Turkish Cup are determined by the Turkish Football 
Federation on the basis of their previous performance in the Turkish Cup and in the 
NFL. The number of teams that play in the Turkish Cup changes every year. Unlike 
the NFL, the Turkish Cup uses the process of elimination.  
Teams that represent Turkey in European tournaments are determined by 
games played among themselves. The first two teams in the NFL participate in the 
Champions League. The winner of the Turkish Cup and the third, fourth and fifth 
teams participate in the UEFA Cup (Union of European Football Associations).  The 
participants in the Cup Winners Cup (CWC) are the winners of each nation’s Cups.   
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Certain characteristics of the Turkish football industry distinguish it from its 
counterpart in the US. First, the experience of sports franchises is not customary. 
There is no franchise market in which urban administrations demand the existence of 
professional sports teams in their territories. Rather, I observe an already settled 
structure (i.e. teams do not move from one city to another) and all sports teams are 
partially subsidized by the budget of the Ministry of Youth and Sports.  Second, the 
teams established in Istanbul dominate the countrywide football industry. Finally, the 
construction of new stadiums is rare. Owing to these characteristics, my study also 
differs from studies in the earlier literature of Sports Economics since I deal with 
overall industrial performance rather than the well-being of individual cities. 
A quick glance at football in Turkey will reveal that the football industry has 
developed rapidly during the last three decades.  At this point, it is important to note 
that the evidence on the importance of football in Turkey is anecdotal rather than 
being in the form of full-fledged academic studies.  I can base my discussion of the 
issue on two studies:  In the first one, Sert (2000), similar to Iso-Ahola and Hatfield 
(1985), reports that football has turned out to be a lifestyle in Turkey. He argues that 
football has an almost perfect association with the more general term ‘sports’ in 
Turkey. Furthermore, the term football instantly calls forth the well-established 
football teams of Istanbul, one of which is Fenerbahce. The mass media has played 
the most important role in cultivating the rapid emergence of this football culture, 
especially through primetime TV broadcasts. Weekly TV broadcast schedules are 
quite focused on football -related material. For instance, it is possible to find more 
than one football magazine issued regularly. Football, in general, turns out to be the 
most commonly shared public concern.  Given the high inclination of people towards 
avoiding daily politics and activist political concerns especially after the 1980s, I can 
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argue that the daily morale of Turkish society is being fed by the success of football 
teams, resulting in a football-addicted society.  Concerning football as a marketable 
mass-media commodity, Miller (1999) can be visited for the televisualization of 
sport and sportification of television, the process of sports teams becoming media 
entities. 
5.5. Model and Estimation Method 
 
5.5.1. Variable Definitions 
 
Industrial performance is measured by using Yg , the monthly rate of growth 
of the industrial production index, which is computed as the logarithmic difference of 
the seasonally adjusted industrial production index, an official statistic compiled and 
published by the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey.  It is computed on the basis of 
the survey data gathered from 913 firms with regard to 403 manufactured staple 
commodities.  The base year of the index is 1997 and it summarizes nearly 73% of 
the total industrial establishments in Turkey. 
For each month t, my notational convention is as follows (Table 5-1 provides 
the full list of success variables): I denote the number of games won, tied, or lost 
with W, T, and L, respectively. A subscript of h refers to games played at Fenerbahce 
home and d stands for the games played away, namely when it plays as guest. 
Absence of a subscript indicates that I aggregate data regardless of the home field. 
The superscript All is for all games; Turkey is for the games played in Turkey with 
Turkish teams regardless of the type of the tournament; Europe is for the games 
played in European tournaments; Season is for the games played in national-season; 
and Non-season stands for domestic games played outside national-season. If there is 
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no superscript, then this denotes all games regardless of the type of the tournament 
and whether the game is played abroad or not.  The actual game data is converted 
into the success variables simply by counting the number of wins, losses and ties for 
each month in prospective classification.  The only exception is that a game actually 
played in month t  is recorded for month t+1 if the first workday after the game 
belongs to month t+1. 
 A final component of my specification concerns the shocks to the economy:  
Turkey had experienced a devastating financial crisis in April of 1994, which 
adversely affected the real sector as well as the financial sector of the Turkish 
economy.  In order to provide sufficient statistical control for this crisis, which 
decreased the industrial growth rate considerably, dummy variables denoted shortly 
by tD are employed.  In particular, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th months of 1994 were 
controlled by using a dummy variable for each, 394−D , 494−D , and 594−D , 
respectively. 
5.5.2. Econometric Specification and Estimation Method 
 
It is assumed that industrial production growth, Yg , follows an autoregressive 
path; hence, it is regressed against its lags up to the fifth order and the success 
variables of Fenerbahce. The inclusion of lags of the monthly rate of change in 
industrial production allows us to account for the dynamics of the original industrial 
production growth series.  The optimal lag length for the growth of industrial 
production is determined by using the Final Prediction Error (FPE) criterion.  FPE 
criterion chooses the optimal lag length such that the residual terms in each time 
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period are not autocorrelated.43  In this way, the variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimated relationship is consistently estimated and the estimated parameters are 
unbiased and efficient. 
The part of variation not explained by the autoregressive model for Yg is 
attributed to Fenerbahce by using the variables jtZ  as shown in (Eq. 5-1): 
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In terms of (Eq. 5-1), the values of kα , 5,...,0=k , and jγ  are the parameters 
to be estimated. The set of variables jZ  are the success variables for Fenerbahce and 
their lags are not included in the analysis, having observed that they were not 
statistically significant in the preliminary analysis, which is not reported in the 
article.  The coefficient of tD  captures and controls for the effects of financial crises 
on industrial production.  The tε ’s are the ... dii  error terms. 
 The success variables in the ten model specifications considered in this study 
can be demonstrated explicitly as follows: 
],,[ LTWZ =     (Specification 1) 
],,[ TurkeyTurkeyTurkey LTWZ =     (Specification 2) 
],,[ EuropeEuropeEurope LTWZ =
    (Specification 3) 
],,[ seasonNonseasonNonseasonNon LTWZ −−−= (Specification 4) 
],,[ SeasonSeasonSeason LTWZ =     (Specification 5) 
],,,,,[ dhdhdh LLTTWWZ =     (Specification 6) 
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 Bayesian Information Criteria suggests the lag order to be 2.  As a robustness test, I repeat the 
analysis with 2 lags. The results were robust. However, in order to save space, these results are not 
reported here. 
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],,,,,[ TurkeydTurkeyhTurkeydTurkeyhTurkeydTurkeyh LLTTWWZ =     (Specification 7) 
],,,,,[ EuropedEuropehEuropedEuropehEuropedEuropeh LLTTWWZ =     (Specification 8) 
],,,,,[ season
Non
d
season
Non
h
season
Non
d
season
Non
h
season
Non
d
season
Non
h LLTTWWZ
−−−−−−
=     (Specification 9) 
],,,,,[ SeasondSeasonhSeasondSeasonhSeasondSeasonh LLTTWWZ =     (Specification 10) 
 The models presented in (Eq. 5-1) and the Specifications 1 to 10 are 
estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares technique.  The coefficients jγ  are of 
my interest in (Eq. 5-1).  Using econometric terminology, these coefficients 
correspond to the transfer function that I estimate, which is the statistically estimated 
relationship that explains how an exogenous movement is transferred to an 
autoregressive endogenous variable. The variable Ytg  is assumed to follow an 
autoregressive process, which is interrupted by jtZ  in each period. The coefficient 
jγ  of the variable jtZ  is tested under the null hypothesis )0:( 0 =jH γ . This type 
of specification is often used in the literature.  For instance, McCallum (1978), 
Alesina and Sachs (1988), Ito and Park (1988), and Heckelman and Berument (1998) 
employ similar transfer function specifications in their analyses of political business 
cycles.  Enders (2004, Chapter 5) can be accessed for an adequate discussion of the 
transfer function analysis. In recent literature, Ergun (2000) also used the transfer 
function analysis to investigate various Turkish macroeconomic variable aggregates, 
including industrial production. In this case, I study the effects of Fenerbahce's 
success on Turkish industrial performance. My work falls in the class of transfer 
function analyses by the definition of jtZ . 
 One may suspect a two-way statistical connection between morale and 
productivity, suggesting simultaneity bias; my treatment of the variables of interest 
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allows us to avoid such bias since it is unlikely that industrial production will affect 
the success of Fenerbahce. In that sense, I do not have a simultaneity bias issue and 
the likelihood of having an accidentally significant statistical relationship is 
minimized at the design stage.  Charemza and Deadman (1992, Chapter 6) can be 
seen for a discussion of the simultaneity bias. 
5.5.3. Data 
 
Data on industrial production reported by the State Institute of Statistics of 
Turkey were compiled from the electronic data delivery system of the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey (It can be reached at http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html). 
Historical game records of the football performance of Fenerbahce in international 
cups as well as in domestic games were compiled from Tanrikulu (2002) and the 
official website of the UEFA. (UEFA data are accessible at http://www.uefa.com). 
The study period is from 1986:8 to 2002:5 and data is compiled or computed at 
monthly frequencies.   
5.6. Results and Commentary 
 
5.6.1. Estimation Results 
 
I present the model estimates in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3. The specifications 
of Table 5-2 hide the home-versus-away field information. In the specifications 
presented in Table 5-3, I distinguish between the home- and away games so as to 
find out whether the field is an important factor in translating the success of the team 
into workers' morale.  The crisis dummies and the lags of the dependent variable are 
common to both tables, as well as the sum of squared residuals and coefficients of 
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determination reported at the end of the estimation. A quick glance at the tables 
shows the negative impact of the April 1994 financial crisis. In all ten specifications, 
the estimates of the dummy variables are significantly negative. The level of 
significance is 5% throughout the study unless otherwise noted. 
 Specification 1 of Table 5-2 provides us with statistically significant evidence 
that Fenerbahce’s total number of wins affects industrial production positively. The 
magnitude of the corresponding coefficient estimate is 0.046. Fenerbahce’s ties and 
losses also seem to affect the dependent variable, yet they are not statistically 
significant.44  Therefore, Fenerbahce’s success is transformed into increased 
productivity.   
 Specification 2 and Specification 3 are designated to test whether the findings 
of Specification 1 stay the same when I separate games as domestic versus the 
international.  When a team plays against foreign rivals, the effect on morale of a win 
is augmented by the enhancement of national identity; whereas, when it plays against 
a domestic rival, the effects might offset each other.  Moreover, as the domestic rival 
loses, there is a possible canceling out effect when the fans of rival team have bad 
moods, and the low productivity of those fans could cancel out the high productivity 
of Fenerbahce fans. In my statistical setup, Specification 2 and Specification 3 are 
used to address these arguments. 
Specification 2 suggests that the wins of Fenerbahce against its domestic 
rivals have no statistically significant impact on productivity.  As depicted by 
Specification 3, the effects on industrial production of Fenerbahce’s wins for games 
played in Europe turn out to be positive and statistically significant. The magnitude 
of the positive transfer from the number of wins to the monthly rate of industrial 
                                                
44
 The level of significance is at the 5% level, unless otherwise mentioned. 
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production growth is about 0.25%. Fenerbahce’s total impact will be proportional to 
the number of wins in a given month. That is, when Fenerbahce wins twice as many 
games in a given month, the feedback to the industrial production is doubled in 
magnitude. Specification 3 also shows significant evidence that industrial production 
is adversely affected by Fenerbahce’s ties and losses in European games, meaning 
that the coefficient estimates have the expected signs though they are not statistically 
significant. 
 As might be predicted, the importance of each game is not the same.  For 
example, the results of non-season games have no relationship to the eventual 
ranking for championship.  These games are usually played before the season starts, 
in order to increase and enhance team cooperation.  In that sense, non-season games 
may have importance since they possess a kind of signaling effect on supporters.  
Specifications 4 and 5, in Table 5-2, report the corresponding estimates. 
Specification 4 is especially important since it demonstrates that Fenerbahce’s wins 
in domestic non-season games have a statistically significant positive impact on 
industrial production, the coefficient estimate having a magnitude of about 0.12, 
annually compounding to nearly 1.5%. Fenerbahce’s losses in these games also 
positively affect the industrial production in a statistically significant manner with a 
coefficient of 0.079. The games that are classified as Non-season are the ones played 
between the popular football teams before the opening of the season. Therefore, this 
finding possibly reflects the initial boosting effects of the approaching new season. 
Moreover, as these are not crucial games for the new season, being the winner or 
loser does not matter considerably. Finally, in Specification 5 I observe that season 
games statistically do not matter for the case of monthly growth in the industrial 
production. 
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 Specifications 1-5, above, suggest that Fenerbahce’s wins have significant 
positive effects on productivity, especially when they are realized in European 
tournaments/cups or in the non-season games.  In order to deepen my understanding, 
I classified the game results further with respect to the venue of each match.  It is 
clear that the likelihood of winning a game at home or away is not the same.  
Generally, it is more difficult to win at the rival’s field, compared to the home field.  
Owing to this observation, I can expect wins at the rival’s field to boost productivity 
further when compared to wins at home.  Consequently, in the specifications 
presented in Table 5-3, I further distinguish between games played at Fenerbahce’s 
home and away. In fact, Table 5-3 is the replicated version of Table 5-2 after I 
distinguish between home versus away games. 
In Specification 6, there is no statistically significant evidence that winning 
either at home or away has explanatory power for industrial growth. The same 
evidence is also valid for the ties and losses of Fenerbahce’s games played at home 
or away.  Specification 7 and Specification 8 decompose the games into the opposing 
team. If the opponent is another Turkish team, the estimation of Specification 7 does 
not reveal any statistically significant evidence that score and location of the game 
have explanatory power for industrial production. The estimates in Specification 8 
are both interesting and important. First, regardless of whether the game is played at 
home or away, Fenerbahce’s winning is associated with increased industrial 
production. This increase is slightly higher if the game is played away; both of the 
estimates are statistically significant. The increase in the monthly growth rate of 
industrial production due to Fenerbahce’s winning is around 0.26%. As a matter of 
fact, since I measure the success of Fenerbahce by the number of games won in a 
given month, the total growth impact of Fenerbahce is doubled when the number of 
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wins doubles. Second, ties in games played away decrease the monthly rate of 
industrial production growth, but this evidence is not statistically significant. On the 
other hand, ties for Fenerbahce home games decrease the industrial production 
significantly. Losses do not change the industrial production in a statistically 
significant manner. 
 Specifications 9 and 10 are intended to measure the effects of non-season and 
season games separately. Specification 9 in Table 5-3 suggests that Fenerbahce’s 
wins in domestic non-season games have a positive impact on industrial production.  
In Specification 10, it can be seen that there is no statistically significant evidence 
that season games affect industrial production. 
 It may seem interesting that the season games won by Fenerbahce have no 
statistically significant effect whereas the games won in European cups have positive 
feedback on industrial performance. As mentioned before, a possible cause for this 
difference is the exclusion of other football teams from my sample, such that 
whenever Fenerbahce wins in national football season, some of the workers are 
induced to produce more with higher morale, while for the non-supporters of 
Fenerbahce it has the opposite effect. There are no such offsetting effects regarding 
the games played by Fenerbahce in European cups since it is a matter of national 
pride, identification and solidarity within the highly football-oriented Turkish 
society, as discussed by Sert (2000) and Bora and Erdogan (1993). 
 Possible sensitivity of the results to my choice of Fenerbahce is an important 
point. For instance, the success of Fenerbahce in the national football season, though 
not totally in a zero-sum fashion, means the failure of another team in any given 
week of the national season fixture. Thus, one may expect the industrial production 
boosting effects due to different football teams to offset each other. This is especially 
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relevant when I consider the competition among the top-ranked teams for the 
championship. Even if these top-ranked teams do not play against each other in a 
given week, the success of one indicates increasing difficulty in the competition for 
the other one, keeping in mind that the national-season champion is determined on 
the basis of cumulative season points.  However, the success of Fenerbahce in games 
played abroad may induce higher productivity for the corresponding month. This is 
due mainly to the general tendency of Turkish people to relate foreign games to 
national pride and identification, as was previously mentioned. 
In the above spirit, the performances of two other major football teams of 
Turkey, namely Besiktas and Galatasaray, are also examined as a robustness 
exercise.  Their results also support my theory with regard to football performance 
and national identification, i.e. in the cases of both Besiktas and Galatasaray, games 
won in the European games affect growth performance.  The estimates of the 
specifications for Besiktas and Galatasaray are not provided in the chapter in order to 
save space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
 Specifically, in the case of Besiktas, the findings are almost the same as those 
for Fenerbahce, except that the wins of Besiktas in domestic games matter as well.  
The case of Galatasaray also resembles the one of the Fenerbahce with the minor 
difference that in European games, the number of wins on an unbiased field increases 
the growth rate.  As a matter of fact, Galatasaray’s success on an unbiased field in 
European cups is of remarkable importance since the matches of UEFA Cup after the 
quarterfinals are played on unbiased fields, as required by UEFA rules. 
All in all, the results obtained for the other two top-ranked teams are parallel 
to those obtained for Fenerbahce.  It is necessary to note that there are significant 
effects in the domestic games only in the case of Besiktas.  Overall, the effects in the 
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European games are significant for all three teams, the UEFA Cup having the 
strongest relationship in the case of Galatasaray, supporting my claim that there is a 
connection between non-domestic games and the national identification and pride, 
which improves the morale of Turkish society. 
5.6.2. Conclusion 
 
Owing to the development of the football industry and the mass media in 
Turkey, I use the success of Fenerbahce, the most popular Turkish football team, as a 
proxy for the morale of workers in Turkey. In a transfer function analysis framework, 
I measure how workers' morale affects industrial performance and find positive 
feedback from workers' morale on industrial growth. The magnitude of this positive 
feedback is a 0.26% increase in the monthly rate of industrial growth for the games 
won by Fenerbahce in European cups. However, similar feedback is not observed for 
domestic games in a statistically significant manner. 
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Table 5-1: List of Success Variables 
hW : wins at home field 
dW : wins in opponent’s field 
hT : ties at home field 
dT : ties in opponent’s field 
hL : losses at home field 
dL : losses in opponent’s field 
Turkey
hW : wins at home field, in the games played in NFL 
Turkey
dW : wins in opponent’s field, in the games played in NFL 
Turkey
hT : ties at home field, in the games played in NFL 
Turkey
dT : ties in opponent’s field, in the games played in NFL 
Turkey
hL : losses at home field, in the games played in NFL 
Turkey
dL : losses in opponent’s field, in the games played in NFL 
Europe
hW : wins at home field, in the European cup games 
Europe
dW : wins in opponent’s field, in the European cup games 
Europe
hT : ties at home field, in the European cup games 
Europe
dT : ties in opponent’s field, in the European cup games 
Europe
hL : losses at home field, in the European cup games 
Europe
dL : losses in opponent’s field, in the European cup games 
seasonNon
hW
−
: wins at home field, in the non-season games 
seasonNon
dW
−
: wins in opponent’s field, in the non-season games 
seasonNon
hT
−
: ties at home field, in the non-season games 
seasonNon
dT
−
: ties in opponent’s field, in the non-season games 
seasonNon
hL
−
: losses at home field, in the non-season games 
seasonNon
dL
−
: losses in opponent’s field, in the non-season games 
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Table 5-1: List of Success Variables (continued) 
Season
hW : wins at home field, in the season games 
Season
dW : wins in opponent’s field, in the season games 
Season
hT : ties at home field, in the season games 
Season
dT : ties in opponent’s field, in the season games 
Season
hL : losses at home field, in the season games 
Season
dL : losses in opponent’s field, in the season games 
W : wins 
T : ties 
L : losses 
TurkeyW : wins in NFL 
TurkeyT : ties in NFL 
TurkeyL : losses in NFL 
EuropeW : wins in European cup games 
EuropeT : ties in European cup games 
EuropeL : losses in European cup games 
seasonNonW − : wins in the non-season games 
seasonNonT − : wins in the non-season games 
seasonNonL − : wins in the non-season games 
SeasonW : wins in the season games 
SeasonT : wins in the season games 
SeasonL : wins in the season games. 
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Table 5-2: Estimates of the Transfer Function Specifications (1 to 5) 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 0.198* 0.237* 0.311* 0.28* 0.262* 
  (2.451) (3.125) (6.009) (3.586) (4.599) 
394−D  -0.586* -0.598* -0.578* -0.587* -0.526* 
   (-7.542)   (-7.523)   (-7.065)   (-7.061)   (-6.342)  
494−D  -0.646* -0.623* -0.579* -0.621* -0.517* 
   (-6.326)   (-6.090)   (-5.599)   (-5.817)   (-5.013)  
594−D  -1.524* -1.476* -1.428* -1.484* -1.451* 
   (-15.733)   (-14.309)   (-13.989)   (-14.218)   (-14.376)  
W  0.046*             
  (2.141)             
T  0.013             
  (0.347)             
L  0.044             
  (1.236)             
TurkeyW  
   0.032          
     (1.392)          
TurkeyT     0.022          
     (0.543)          
TurkeyL
 
   0.035          
     (0.767)          
EuropeW  
      0.251*       
        (3.769)       
EuropeT        -0.055       
         (-0.515)        
EuropeL        -0.036       
         (-0.678)        
seasonNonW −  
         0.117*    
           (3.065)   
seasonNonT −
 
         0.029    
           (0.385)    
seasonNonL −
 
         0.079*    
           (2.037)    
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Table 5-2: Estimates of the Transfer Function Specifications (1 to 5, 
continued) 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
Explanatory Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
SeasonW  
            0.026 
              (1.067) 
SeasonT              0.006 
              (0.142) 
SeasonL              0.01 
              (0.197) 
Yg 1−  0.288* 0.298* 0.302* 0.307* 0.306* 
  (3.613) (3.726) (3.701) (3.919) (3.746) 
Yg 2−  0.277* 0.281* 0.298* 0.305* 0.283* 
  (3.609) (3.638) (3.800) (3.841) (3.575) 
Yg 3−  0.012 0.000 0.019 0.006 0.001 
  (0.144) 0.000 (0.205) (0.069) (0.013) 
Yg 4−  -0.049 -0.053 -0.065 -0.068 -0.054 
   (-0.639)   (-0.688)   (-0.845)   (-0.879)   (-0.708)  
Yg 5−  0.193* 0.200* 0.178* 0.18* 0.189* 
  (2.895) (2.950) (2.709) (2.751) (2.781) 
           
SSR  34.6 35.12 34.67 34.08 35.47 
2R  0.88 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 
2R
 
0.55 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.54 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters. (*) 
denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5-3: Estimates of the Transfer Function Specifications (6 to 10) 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
Explanatory Variables 6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 0.238* 0.257* 0.309* 0.277* 0.300* 
  (3.162) (3.264) (5.979) (5.209) (3.755) 
394−D  -0.695* -0.691* -0.581* -0.526* -0.699* 
  (-6.466) (-6.424) (-7.081) (-6.338) (-5.847) 
494−D  -0.604* -0.595* -0.576* -0.499* -0.595* 
  (-5.536) (-5.294) (-5.538) (-4.792)  (-5.239) 
594−D  -1.503* -1.482* -1.425* -1.397* -1.491* 
  (-14.123) (-13.462) (-13.854) (-13.524) (-13.268) 
hW  0.036             
  (0.864)             
dW  0.065             
  (1.570)             
hT  0.081             
  (1.226)             
dT  -0.035             
  (-0.620)             
hL  0.050             
  (0.960)             
dL  0.003             
  (0.056)             
Turkey
hW  
   0.021          
     (0.494)          
Turkey
dW  
   0.058          
     (1.340)          
Turkey
hT  
   0.082          
     (1.230)          
Turkey
dT  
   -0.035          
     (-0.596)          
Turkey
hL  
   0.050          
     (0.824)          
Turkey
dL  
   0.016          
     (0.235)          
  
 
103 
 
 
Table 5-3: Estimates of the Transfer Function Specifications (6 to 10, 
continued) 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
Explanatory Variables 6 7 8 9 10 
Europe
hW  
      0.257*       
        (2.148)       
Europe
dW  
      0.264*       
        (2.001)       
Europe
hT  
      -0.282*       
        (-2.077)       
Europe
dT  
      -0.026       
        (-0.194)       
Europe
hL  
      0.017       
        (0.148)       
Europe
dL  
      -0.090       
        (-1.177)       
seasonNon
hW
−
 
         0.178*    
           (1.936)    
seasonNon
dW
−
 
         0.089    
           (0.814)    
seasonNon
hT
−
 
         0.144    
           (1.218)    
seasonNon
dT
−
 
         0.161    
           (1.485)    
seasonNon
hL
−
 
         0.105    
           (1.139)    
seasonNon
dL
−
 
         0.049    
           (0.559)    
Season
hW  
            0.011 
              (0.251) 
Season
dW  
            0.057 
              (1.299) 
Season
hT  
            0.083 
              (1.146) 
Season
dT  
            -0.055 
              (-0.902) 
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Table 5-3: Estimates of the Transfer Function Specifications (6 to 10, 
continued) 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
Explanatory Variables 6 7 8 9 10 
Season
hL  
            0.020 
              (0.282) 
Season
dL  
            -0.007 
              (-0.109) 
Yg 1−  0.262* 0.275* 0.302* 0.281* 0.279* 
  (3.178) (3.346) (3.708) (3.607) (3.329) 
Yg 2−  0.298* 0.296* 0.300* 0.318* 0.304* 
  (3.964) (3.972) (3.788) (4.027) (4.000) 
Yg 3−  -0.002 -0.009 0.019 -0.018 -0.007 
  (-0.021) (-0.108) (0.209) (-0.213) (-0.079) 
Yg 4−  -0.064 -0.063 -0.069 -0.072 -0.066 
  (-0.842) (-0.827) (-0.892) (-0.909) (-0.879) 
Yg 5−  0.207* 0.206* 0.179* 0.206* 0.195* 
  (3.072) (3.040) (2.729) (3.161) (2.892) 
           
SSR  34.21 34.58 34.58 33.63 34.79 
2R
 
0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
2R  0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated parameters.  (*) 
denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I have covered the problems offered by four areas of 
investigation and through four essays. The basic finding of the first essay (Chapter 2) 
was a statistically significant negative relationship between treasury auction maturity 
and interest rates, indicating a negatively sloped yield curve – a finding which is 
especially valid for the pre-2001 sample. This finding lent empirical support to 
Alesina et al. (1990) article. Changes in the slope of the estimated yield curve in the 
post-2001 sub-sample are also reported in Chapter 2, having also noted that the post-
2001 period is characterized by higher overall stability of the economy.  
The second essay (Chapter 3) revealed that an increase in the USD value of 
the Euro appreciates the real exchange rate, decreases inflation and increases output. 
This empirical finding is important: The case of Turkey with regard to changes in 
USD-Euro parity establishes a benchmark example for similar emerging market 
economies by demonstrating the extent of the exposure of a small-open economy to 
the relative movements of two big currencies.  
 Chapter 4 (Essay 3) assesses the relationship between on-budget and off-
budget public expenditures. This relationship is especially interesting for economies 
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like Turkey, in which the ratio of the consolidated budget to the PSBR changes from 
year to year and does not exhibit a stable pattern. My major result is that the PSBR 
increases in response to a positive innovation to the consolidated budget deficit.  In 
other words, even when the policy-makers induce an expansion of the consolidated 
budget, it is still possible for the off-budget items to increase. One another important 
point that needs to be highlighted is that a decrease in PSBR deficit is actually 
associated with an increase in budget deficit.  This might be due to increased efforts 
in the past to limit off-consolidated budget deficit, so that total (PSBR) deficit 
decreases, but I put partly these decreased items to the consolidated budget.  This 
suggests that even if a tight fiscal policy is adopted, the consolidated budget deficit 
might indicate loose fiscal policy.  Thus, it is worth to mention that the information 
provided by the consolidated budget deficit might be misleading for judging about 
the stance of the fiscal policy in Turkey.  
The last essay (Chapter 5) examines the connection between Turkish 
industrial production performance and the success of a popular Turkish football 
team, namely Fenerbahce. The success of Fenerbahce is interpreted as a proxy for the 
workers' mood/morale.  Performing a transfer function analysis on my data set, I 
reveal a positive feedback from Fenerbahce's success to economic performance such 
that the monthly industrial growth rate increases with the number of games won by 
Fenerbahce in European cups, regardless of where the game is played. On the other 
hand, the evidence of the effects of Fenerbahce’s domestic games on industrial 
performance is not statistically significant. 
The main claim of Chapter 5 is that when people’s favorite team is successful 
then they get in a better mood and become more productive.  Since we do not have a 
direct measure of “mood”, I employ the success of a popular football team as an 
  
 
107 
 
indicator of people’s “mood”. I also provide an array of possible theoretical 
explanations for my hypothesis and propose a transmission mechanism that defines 
the process that links football success to workers’ productivity. In fact, the proxy of 
mood in Chapter 5 (i.e. the football team) can be replaced with another social 
indicator, if such an indicator exists. For instance, psychological effects of the 
performance/standing of a political party could be analyzed if such data existed. In 
this way, the theory of Chapter 5 can be well extended to cover wider issues 
pertaining to social mood or morale. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Alesina, Prati &Tabellini (1990) and Calvo&Guidotti (1992) 
Models 
 
 
Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) 
 
Here, I presented a formal model that reveals a negative relationship between 
the treasury auction maturity and interest rates.  In order to do that I employ an 
infinite horizon model, which is based on maximizing a representative individual's 
lifetime utility function and minimizing the loss function of the government, based 
on that of Alesina et al. (1990). In this model, a small economy is inhabited by an 
infinitely-lived individual who maximizes her lifetime utility: 
(A1.1) 
∞
=
>>=
0
01;)(
t
t
t cuU ββ  
where tc  denotes consumption at time t  and (.)u  is a regular concave utility 
function.  In each period, the individual is endowed with one unit of non-storable 
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output and she pays a distortionary tax tτ  to the government. The consumer's 
disposable income is given by )( tF τ  which is expressed as: 
(A1.2) )(1)( ttt fF τττ −−=  
where (.)f  shows the distortion of tax with 0)0( =f , 0(.) >′f , and 0(.) >′′f .  The 
convexity of (.)f  allows us to capture the tax-smoothing behavior. 
Consumers have access to perfect international capital markets in which they 
can borrow and lend at a risk-free interest rate equal to their discount factor, β/1 .  I 
denote those external tax-free assets held as of the beginning of period t  with tψ . 
There exist short-term and long-term debts with designated maturities of 1-
period and 2-periods, respectively. The utility maximizing individual has the 
following budget constraint: 
(A1.3) )1()1()()( 2122111 ttttttttttttttttttt bbDFbqbqc θθθψτβψ −+−+−+≤+++ −−+++++  
where ji b  denotes debt issued in period i  and maturing in period j  and  ji q   is the 
corresponding market price. )( tD θ and tθ   are the cost of repudiation and the 
fraction of the debt repudiated at time t , respectively. The default parameter, tθ , is 
assumed to be the same for both types of debt maturing at time t . Alesina et al 
(1990) assume that the cost of default is such that 0)( =tD θ  if 0=tθ  or 1=−itθ , 
and 0>i , αθ =)( tD  otherwise.45 
                                                
45
 The timing of the events in the auction process is as follows: First, the government determines the 
maturity of the borrowings (one- versus two-period). Then it announces the prices at which it is 
willing to sell the debt, and the maximum amounts for sale for each maturity.  Later, on the basis of 
these prices, the private sector chooses how much debt to buy. Finally, the government chooses the 
combination of tτ  and tθ  that satisfies the government budget constraint, given the amount of debt 
outstanding and the debt just sold. The following should hold at an equilibrium: First, in each period 
and for all sequences of previous aggregate histories, the prices are optimal for the government given 
the private sector reaction to the announced prices.  Second, the private sector portfolio decision is 
optimal, given the prices and the expected future equilibrium outcomes. Third, the choices of tτ  and 
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The government's budget constraint is given by: 
(A1.4) 221121 )1()1( ++++−− ++≤−+− ttttttttttttttt qbqbbb τθθ  
and the no arbitrage condition is expressed as: 
(A1.5) )1()1( 22211 etttettt qq ++++ −=−= θβθβ  
where the superscript e  is used to denote private expectations. 
If the government does not default in the absence of a confidence crisis, the 
discounted present value of the debt as of the beginning of period 0  is given by: 
(A1.6) 110201 bbbb −−− ++≡ β  
and the optimal tax rate becomes: 
(A1.7) ,...1,0*;)1( =≡−= tbt τβτ  
The government, in the absence of a crisis, will not repudiate if: 
(A1.8) αββα ≡−−≥ ])1[(1
1 bf  
Inequality (A1.8) implies that the government will not repudiate if the cost of 
repudiation, α , is larger than the tax distortions needed for servicing the debt, α .  
Now, consider a confidence crisis in period t . If the private expectations 0; >+ i
e
itθ , 
do not depend on the aggregate history of the game in previous periods and if 
1=+
e
itθ for 0>i , then in period t  the government can either default or it can repay 
the debt.  In the first case, consumption is 
(A1.9) dt cc ≡−−+−= )1(1)1( 0 βαψβ    
whereas in the latter case, taxes have to be as follows: 
(A1.10) ttttt bb 21 −− +=τ    
                                                                                                                                     
tθ  are optimal for the government, given the private current investment decision and the effect of the 
current policy on the expected future equilibrium outcomes.  
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(A1.11) 111 +−+ = ttt bτ  
(A1.12) 1;0 +>= tssτ  
If the government chooses to repay, consumption from t  onwards ( Rc ) is: 
(A1.13)   tsbfbbfc tttttttRs ≥++−−−+= +−−− )];()()[1()1(1 1121 βββψ  
Comparing the consumption figures in the two cases, I can say that the government 
chooses to repay if and only if: 
(A1.14) ttttttt bfbbf αβα ≡++≥ +−−− )]()([ 1121  
It should be clear that tα  is the counterpart of α  in the case of a confidence crisis. 
It can be shown that, since no debt is repaid between periods 0 and t , tα > α  
for all t .  Hence, if ααα ≥>t , then there exists an equilibrium in which a 
confidence crisis occurs in period t  or earlier. Thus, tα  depends on the maturity 
structure of the public debt. 
A consequent proposition in Alesina et al (1990) demonstrates that 
equilibrium with a confidence crisis is less likely to occur if (1) only long-term debt 
is issued and (2) the same amount of debt matures in each period. This is shown by 
minimizing tα  by the choice of three borrowing variables, tt b2− , tt b1−  and 
11 +− tt b , subject to a constant net present value of debt, which is given by: 
(A1.15)   ,...1,0;1121 =≡++ +−−− tbbbb tttttt β  
The first order conditions of this minimization problem imply: 
(A1.16)   1121 +−−− =+ tttttt bbb  
Since the maximal element *α  is minimized when all the elements of the sequence  
tα  are minimized and since this happens when Equation A1.16 holds for all t , 
combining Equation A1.15 and Equation A1.16 obtains 01 =− tt b  and 
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112 +−− = tttt bb  for all t .  In other words, only the two period (i.e. long maturity) 
debt must be issued and an equal amount of debt should mature in each period. 
If the maturity shortens, by using Equation A1.14 and Equation A1.15, tα  
increases.  In other words, the cost of tax distortions becomes higher, thus the 
fraction of the repudiated debt increases. When tθ  increases, by using the no 
arbitrage condition given by Equation A1.5, it is apparent that bond price tq  
decreases.  This reduction in bond price corresponds to an increase in the real interest 
rate on the bond.  In a nutshell, Alesina et al (1990) suggest that there is a negative 
linkage between the maturity of debt and the yield of bonds, the latter being the 
dependent variable, when tαα ≥ . [A] 
Another important point in Alesina et al (1990) concerns the risk premium.  
Supposing that 01 >+
e
tθ  in every period t  with a known probability, the problem is 
re-treated and it is concluded that until a confidence crisis occurs, the government 
has to pay a risk premium on its liability to compensate for the default risk.  Since 
tα  is lower, the risk premium can be reduced by lengthening and balancing the 
maturity structure of government debt. [B] 
Therefore, results [A] and [B] together imply a drop in the real yield on bonds 
as maturity lengthens and which has been empirically assessed using the Turkish 
data in Section 3. 
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Calvo and Guidotti (1992) 
 
 Calvo and Guidotti (1992) also states a negative linkage between the maturity 
of debt and the real return on bonds. However, real yield is designated as an 
exogenous variable in their model framework. 
 Calvo and Guidotti (1992) used the following government loss function tL  at 
time t : 
(A1.17) 
∞
=
− +=
ts
ss
ts
t HxVL )]()([ piβ  
where I denote the discount factor and tax revenue with β and sx  respectively, and   
1/ −= sss PPpi stands for the inflation factor. (.)V  and (.)H  are strictly convex 
functions where )0(V ′  and )1(H ′  are equal to zero; that is, no taxes and zero 
inflation achieve zero loss. I define the sum of all debt obligations that mature in 
period τ and that have been issued before time t  as: 
(A1.18) 
−
=
=
1
0
)(
t
s
ssst IbPZ τττ   
where τsb  stands for the real value in period s  of government bonds issued in 
period  s  with maturity in period τ . τsI  stands for the one plus interest rate of those 
bonds issued in period s  with maturity τ  and sP  is the price level in period s . 
Then, the government in period t  is subject to the following budget 
constraint: 
(A1.19) t
t
tf
tt gP
tZbx +=+ )(  
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In this Equation ftb  is the sum of all bonds issued at t  i.e. ∞ +== 1ts ts
f
t bb  and tg  
is for government expenditure. 
Now by substituting )(tZt  into (A1.19) I get: 
(A1.20) t
t
s
st
st
f
tt grbbx +=+ 
−
=
−
1
0
 
I assume that agents are rational and bonds are pure assets in their portfolios. Hence, 
the Fisher Equation holds in equilibrium. In other words, 
(A1.21) 1;...21 −≤= ++− tsrI tssstst pipipi  
Normalizing 0P to unity so that 11...pipipi −= tttP , and substituting 
stR −  from the 
Fisher Equation, (A1.20) is rewritten as follows: 
(A1.22) t
t
s ss
ststf
tt g
Ibbx
t
+=+ 
−
= ++
1
0 ...21 pipipi
 
Now in order to minimize the government loss function, I write the first order 
condition as: 
(A1.23) 0)()( =′+
∂
∂
′ t
t
t
t H
x
xV pi
pi
 
In order to obtain ttx pi∂∂ , I take the derivative of budget constraint (A1.20) with 
respect to tpi . 
(A1.24) 
t
f
t
t
s ttss
stst
t
t bIbx
pipipipipipi ∂
∂
−−=
∂
∂

−
=
−++
1
0
2
121 ...
 
and from the budget constraint of the government for the period τ  where t>τ , 
taking the total differential of this budget constraint, I can get t
f
tb pi∂∂ . After using 
the Fisher Equation and making the necessary calculations, I get the final equality as 
follows: 
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(A1.25) tttt HxV pipiω )()( ′=′  
Clearly tω  represents the total value of government debt as of period t ; that is, in 
terms of period t  prices. Therefore, tω  stands for: 
(A1.26) st
t
s s
st rb
−
−
=
∞
=
 








=
1
0 τ
τω  
Given a positive total debt and tax revenue at period t , Equation (A1.25) shows that 
along an equilibrium path, inflation will be positively associated with tax revenue. 
Moreover the relationship between tax and inflation depends on the value of 
outstanding debt. Then rewriting the budget constraint, the debt accumulation 
Equation of 1+t  with respect to t  becomes: 
(A1.27) )(1 tttt xgr −+=+ ωω  
Following Calvo (1988), I move one step ahead and assume, for simplicity, that 
Equation (A1.25) is invertible. Then, at the equilibrium, tpi  can be expressed as a 
function of taxes and the total government debt: 
(A1.28) ),( ttt x ωpi Π=  
Plugging this definition into the government loss function, I have 
(A1.29) 
∞
=
− Π+=
ts
sss
ts
t xHxVL ))],(()([ ωβ  
 A crucial assumption for this minimization problem is that the government in 
period t  can control the future debt accumulation since I use the Fisher Equation and 
the interest rate factor is predetermined by the government. In many countries, the 
value of the past government debt obligations at each time point is regarded as a 
predetermined variable, recalling for the time inconsistency problem, which is 
overcome by redefining the debt accumulation Equation. 
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(A1.30) τ
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is the value of the total government debt obligations at period t  from the perspective 
of the government at time i  ( t< ). In the first term, I do not use the Fisher Equation 
since it is the debt issued before period i . However, on the right hand side, I 
internalize the Fisher Equation. In this case, the debt accumulation Equation takes 
the following form: 
(A1.31) )(
,,1 ttitit xgr −+=+ ωω  
Observe that in equilibrium, since Fisher Equation holds again, I have tit ωω =, . 
Now the debt accumulation is independent of the government of that period and the 
preceding Equation boils down to Equation (A1.27). 
Consider the government's minimization problem at 1=t , in which the government 
chooses inflation and tax sequences to minimize tL . 
For simplicity, I rewrite the loss function as: 
(A1.32) ),()()(
2
1,
2
11 
∞
=
−++
t
tt
t xCHxV ωββpi  
Then, the government minimizes Equation (A1.32) subject to the flow constraint for 
1=i  given by Equation (A1.31) and the total government debt obligation 1,tω , with 
the transversality condition given by 0lim 1, =
−
∞→ t
t
t R ω . 
For the interior optimum, the first order condition for the government at 1=t  is: 
(A1.33) 1111 )()( pipiω HxV ′=′  
Then writing the Euler Equation I get 
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where 1,1ω  is given by: 
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then rewriting the previous Equation I get: 
(A1.36)
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Finally I are left with: 
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Equation (A1.37) indicates that the ratio of the total real value of longer-term bonds 
to the total value of bonds is a decreasing function of the real interest rate r . This 
suggests a reciprocal relationship between the newly issued debt at time 1+t  
(auction maturity) and the real interest rate.  
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Appendix 2: An Illustrative Model 
 
 
In this appendix, I elaborate on the structural framework employed by Kamin 
and Rogers (2000) so as to capture the effects of USD-Euro parity on economic 
performance. In my model, total GDP (Y ) is composed of two components, which are 
the domestic demand ( DD ) and net exports ( NX ) as given in Equation A2.1: 
(A2.1)   NXDDY +=  
In Equation A2.2, net exports is related positively to the real exchange rate, 
RER
 (defined such that an increase indicates real depreciation of currency), negatively 
to output (Y ) and negatively to USD-Euro parity ( Parity ), defined as the number of 
Euros per USD: 
(A2.2)   ParityaYaRERaNX 232221 −−=  
In Equation A2.3, domestic demand is affected by real interest rate ( r ), fiscal 
deficit ( FISCDEF ), the real stock bank credits ( RCREDIT ), the nominal interest rate 
( i ), the inflation rate (pi ), the real exchange rate ( RER ) and the real wage ( RW ).  As 
real exchange rate affects net exports positively, additional effects on aggregate demand 
are assumed to be negative: 
(A2.3) ParityaRWaRERaaiaRCREDITaFISCDEFaraDD 3837363534333231 −+−−−++−= pi  
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In Equation A2.4, the supply of bank credit is explained by the bank’s main 
sources of funds, namely the real domestic money ( RM ), and foreign borrowing proxied 
by private capital flows ( KA ): 
(A2.4)   KAaRMaRCREDIT 4241 +=  
Equation A2.5 depicts the standard money demand function: 
(A2.5)   iaYaRM 5251 −=  
The central bank’s reaction function is supposed to have the following form 
where it includes inflation (pi ), output (Y ), and capital flows ( KA ). 
(A2.6)   KAaYaai 636261 −+= pi  
 Equation A2.7 presents the CPI inflation rate as in Kamin (1996).  It is 
determined by real exchange rate ( RER ), output (Y ) and the rate of nominal exchange 
rate depreciation ( 'E ). 
(A2.7)   '737271 EaYaRERa ++=pi  
Equation A2.8 is the interest parity condition.  Net capital flows ( KA ) is 
determined by the nominal interest rate ( i ), the rate of nominal exchange rate ( 'E ), and 
the US interest rate ( USi ). 
(A2.8)   USiaEaiaKA 838281 '−−=  
 In Equation A2.9, exchange rate depreciation is defined as a function of domestic 
inflation (pi ), foreign inflation ( USpi ), and real exchange rate ( RER ). 
(A2.9)   RERaaaE US 939291' +−= pipi  
 In Equation A2.10, balance of payments pressures drive the real exchange rate: 
(A2.10)   KAaNXaRER 102101 −−=  
 The non-interest fiscal deficit ( FISCDEF ) declines in response to an increase in 
output,Y , reflecting higher tax revenues. Increases in net capital inflows ( KA ) are 
assumed to raise the fiscal deficit because they allow the government both to borrow 
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more abroad and to pursue less austere policies. Higher inflation (pi ) prompts the 
government to tighten its fiscal policies.  
(A2.11)   pi113112111 aKAaYaFISCDEF −+−=  
 Real wages ( RW ) depend positively on output (Y ) but negatively on inflation 
(pi ) following the contractionary devaluation hypothesis. 
(A2.12)   pi122121 aYaRW −=  
By substituting the endogenous variables, the 12-Equation system reduces to a 
three-Equation system that I call the core model: 
(A2.13)   USaYaRERa pipi 131211 ′−′−′=  
(A2.14)   ParityaaiaaYaRER USUS 2524232221 ′−′−′−′−′= pipi  
(A2.15)   ParityaRERaiaaaraY USUS 363534333231 ′+′−′−′+′+′−= pipi  
 The coefficients in Equations A2.13, A2.14 and A2.15 are not straightforward; 
i.e. they are complicated combinations of the coefficients of my illustrative model.  
Thus, I have written my prior view as to the signs of those coefficients whenever they 
are ambiguous; where each ija  in Equations A2.13-A2.15 is positive and the signs in 
front show the direction of the relationship.  Having focused on the signs of Parity  in 
Equations A2.14 and A2.15, I can say that its sign is negative in Equation A2.14 and 
positive in Equation A2.15.  This prior view is due to two points.  First, as USD-Euro 
parity increases, there occurs an increase in the terms of trade, namely in the price of 
exportables over the price of importables.  Since the real trade flows will not be affected 
in the short-term, net exports improve, as does the output.  Second, an increase in Parity  
has recently caused a relative appreciation of the Turkish lira against the USD and since 
I measure the real exchange rate as the WPI deflated TL value of the USD, I can expect 
Parity  to inversely affect RER . 
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 As a final remark, I should note that Parity  does not appear in Equation 
A2.13, yet it affects inflation indirectly through its effects on the RER  and Y , as 
mentioned above. 
